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Abstract 
The focus for this thesis is how entrepreneurial firms perceive and act upon opportunities in 
times of recession to learn about ways to get through it. To investigate this, this thesis take a 
look at an industry that is experiencing recession, the offshore wind energy industry in Norway. 
 
This thesis found that entrepreneurial firms perceived many opportunities in times of recession, 
but not due to the recession, as a necessity. When it comes to how they act upon opportunities, 
this thesis found that all the entrepreneurial firms acted on opportunities regarding 
establishment of partnerships and collaboration. However, actually getting and holding this 
partnership were tough in times of recession. Entrepreneurial firms also highlight adaption and 
the firm’s flexibility as important for the firm’s survival 
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1 Introduction 
Business cycles “consist of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic 
activities, followed by similar general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into 
the expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent, but not periodic; 
in duration, business cycle vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years” (Burns and 
Mitchell, 1946 as cited in Claessens et al., 2009). Recession is the contraction phase of the 
business cycle and is defined as “a significant decline in economic activity spread across the 
economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, 
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales”1. Recessions are not uncommon, 
they happen approximately every 6 years (Srinivasan et al., 2005), and when they do, they 
typically last about four quarters. In the 1960-2007 period, recessions have been observed to 
last as long as thirteen quarters (Claessens et al., 2009). The global recession, triggered by the 
financial crisis in USA in 2007, is considered the most severe recession since the Great 
Depression of the 1930’s (Papaoikonomou et al., 2012, Claessens et al., 2009), and is by no 
means over yet (Fanelli and Evans, 2013).  
 
During periods of recession consumers generally have less money to spend and cut back 
personal spending in response to the overall decline in economic activity. With less money on 
hand, they become more deliberate in their purchases, more sensitive to personal finances, and 
more likely to abstain from or delay purchases. Similarly, businesses cut back on spending to 
                                               
 
1
 http://nber.org/cycles/ retrieved 05.05.2013.  
2 
 
conserve cash, particularly on investment spending that can be deferred or delayed. As a 
consequence many firms engage in price cutting wars to produce sales, and reduction of staff 
and other desperate moves to cut costs. Investors get less willing to invest and credit from 
banks become less available due to the increased risk (Pearce II and Michael, 2006). This 
cause many firms to go under. An average of more than 500,000 businesses failed in the United 
States during each of the 10 recessions (now 112) that have occurred there since the end of 
World War II (Pearce II and Michael, 2006). 
 
Entrepreneurial firms with their relatively smaller size, little or no diversification, and 
considerable resource constraints are particularly affected by periods of recession. During the 
1990-1991 recession in the US for instance, the failure rate in the manufacturer group had by 
mid-year 1991 risen 37% from the previous year (Pearce II and Michael, 1997). 
  
Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial firm are an important group. According to Parker (2012) they 
create jobs (Birch, 1979), commercialize and disseminate innovations (Acs and Audretsch, 
1988), accumulate savings and wealth (Quadrini, 2000; Cagetti and de Nardi, 2006) and drive 
economic growth (van Stel et al., 2005). Another important feature the entrepreneur is claimed 
to have is their willingness to take on risk (Khilstrom & Laffont, 1979; Knight, 1921 as cited in 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, Landström, 1999). By finding more or less clear opportunities, 
and taking on the high risk in times of recession, the entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial firms 
can help drive economic recovery and growth by contributing to job creation and social 
progression (Elmore, 2009 as cited in Papaoikonomou et al., 2012, Parker, 2012).  
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 http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html retrieved 05.05.2013.  
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Because of the financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed, the economists have 
refocused their attention on the determinants of business cycles and recessions (Parker, 2012). 
However, little research have been devoted to help guide entrepreneurial firms through these 
tough periods (Pearce II and Michael, 2006, Pearce II and Michael, 1997, Papaoikonomou et 
al., 2012, Parker, 2012). 
 
This thesis explores the opportunities in recession as a step in helping entrepreneurial firms get 
through. Eckhardt and Shane (2003) distinguish between common profit opportunities and 
entrepreneurial opportunities, where entrepreneurial opportunities are defined as situations in 
which new goods, services, raw materials, markets and organizing methods can be introduced 
through the formation of new means, ends, or means-ends relationships. While non-
entrepreneurial decisions maximize scarce resources across previously developed means and 
ends, entrepreneurial decisions involve the creation or identification of new ends and means 
(Gaglio and Katz, 2001) previously undetected or unutilized by market participants (Eckhardt 
and Shane, 2003). In broad terms, an opportunity may be the chance to meet a market need (or 
interest or want) through a creative combination of resources to deliver superior value 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Kirzner, 1973; Casson, 1982 as cited in Ardichvili et al., 2003). This thesis 
does not omit one or the other, all kind of opportunities can be useful in helping the firm survive. 
According to Shane (2000) entrepreneurs discover opportunities related to the information that 
they already possess. Inside information from entrepreneurial firms that have experienced 
recession can hopefully help others become able to find good opportunities and survive the 
tough contraction phase of the business cycle. To get this insight, this thesis take a closer look 
at four entrepreneurial firms in the offshore wind energy industry in Norway. 
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The offshore wind energy industry is a relatively new industry in Norway. In 2009 many believed 
the Norwegian petroleum industry to be heading into a new phase, the maturity phase, and the 
probability of finding new big oil fields to be slim. The European Union (EU) had determined a 
new and ambitious directive stating that by 2020 at least 20% of EU’s energy consumption 
should come from renewable energy sources (Volden et al., 2009b). With much experience and 
knowledge from offshore activities there was therefore seen much potential in offshore wind. 
Former Oil and energy minister Terje Riis-Johansen stated multiple times in 2009 and 2010 that 
offshore wind power could become Norway’s next industry and energy adventure, a statement 
also backed by Industry minister Trond Giske (Hansen and Steen, 2011).  
 
New technology was needed and many new firms arose to the occasion and started developing 
new solutions. But the financial crisis reached Norway, new big oil fields were found (Aldous 
and Avaldsnes, announced august 20113, now called the Johan Sverdrup field4) and political 
focused changed. According to Pearce II and Michael (2006) people in recession get less willing 
to invest in new products and projects. Entrepreneurial firms in the offshore wind industry, a new 
industrial production industry, will therefore be a typical group affected by the common business 
cycle and its downturns. And although Norway was not of the countries hardest hit by recession, 
the entrepreneurial firms in this industry started to struggle.  
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 http://www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/innland/Nytenkning-ga-gigantfunn-i-Nordsjoen-
6283883.html#.UaZmB9I3B6Y retrieved 12.04.2013. 
4
 http://www.dn.no/energi/article2311691.ece retrieved 12.04.2013. 
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1.1 Research question 
Exploring opportunities is a step towards finding good ways for entrepreneurial firms to get 
through periods of economic recession. This thesis looks at four different entrepreneurial firms 
in an industry hit by recession, the offshore wind energy industry in Norway, and asks:  
1. How do entrepreneurial firms perceive opportunities in recession?  
2. What opportunities do they see?  
3. How do they act upon opportunities? 
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2 Frame of reference 
2.1 The offshore wind energy industry 
Offshore wind energy is production of electricity from wind turbines out at sea. One 
distinguishes between three different types of offshore wind technologies: Firstly, there are 
bottom-mounted windmills in shallow water < 20 meters. Secondly, there are bottom-mounted 
windmills in medium deep/deep waters. Lastly, there are the floating windmills (Volden et al., 
2009b).  
 
The technology for the last two types was in September 2009 ranked technological and market 
immature. The bottom-mounted in shallow waters, however, is considered mature both in terms 
of technology and market (Volden et al., 2009b). Numbers from January 2012 by The European 
Wind Energy Association showed that there were 1371 turbines installed and grid connected, 
totaling 3813 MW in 53 wind farms in ten European countries: up from 1136 turbines, totaling 
2946 MW in 45 wind farms in nine European countries at the end of 2010. The farms are being 
deployed in deeper and deeper water. The average water depth of offshore wind farms where 
work was carried out during 2011 was 22.8 meters. This is substantially more (+31%) than in 
2010, when average water depth was 17.4 meters. There were only two full scale grid-
connected floating turbines (Association, 2012).  
 
One of the floating turbines is Hywind in Norway. This was the world’s first full-scale floating 
wind turbine. In 2009 Statoil invested around NOK 400 million in the construction and further 
development of the pilot, and in research and development related to the wind turbine concept. 
Through the first two years of testing, the concept has been verified, and it continually exceeds 
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performance beyond expectations. According to Statoil (2012) the Hywind concept could with 
few operational challenges, excellent production output, and well-functioning technical systems 
revolutionize the future of offshore wind5. The second full-scale floating offshore wind project is 
developed by Principal Power and located in Portugal6.  
 
The market and technology for floating and bottom-mounted in deeper water can still be 
considered immature; there are still no floating wind turbines in commercial operation anywhere 
in the world as of May, 2013. However, thing are starting to happen within this field. Due to the 
major earthquake and the tsunami causing a nuclear accident in Japan in 2011, the country now 
prepares to build the world’s largest commercial power plant using floating windmills to cut its 
reliance on atomic energy. Land-based wind-energy development is limited by Japan’s 
mountains, making offshore developments more viable, and the depth of its oceans creates a 
bigger potential for floating turbine technology. The country aims to develop the floating offshore 
wind turbines for commercialization by March 20177.  
 
Also in America the interest seems to be increasing. The first grid-connected offshore wind 
turbine deployed off the coast of North America, VolturnUS in 1:8 size, was launched in Brewer 
on May 31 2013 by the University of Maine’s Advanced Structures and Composites Center and 
its partners8. Statoil is also connected to a project to commercialize floating wind there. The 
USD 120 million project would put four 3MW wind turbines on floating spar-buoy structures 
                                               
 
5
http://www.statoil.com/en/TechnologyInnovation/NewEnergy/RenewablePowerProduction/Offshore/Hywi
nd/Pages/HywindPuttingWindPowerToTheTest.aspx retrieved 18.04.2013. 
6
http://www.nawindpower.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.11350 retrieved 20.04.2013. 
7
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-29/floating-windmills-in-japan-help-wind-down-nuclear-power-
energy.html  retrieved 15.05.2013. 
8
https://umaine.edu/news/blog/2013/05/30/the-launch-of-volturnus-18/ retrieved 04.06.2013. 
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tethered to the seabed in 140 meters of water off Boothbay Harbor, and power could be flowing 
into the grid, via undersea cable, by 20169. 
 
Offshore wind farms far from land offer some clear advantages compared to the farms near 
shore or on land. In coastal areas there is potential for much conflict, especially in terms of 
shipping lanes, fisheries, birds and sea mammals. Further offshore the wind is stable and 
stronger. This makes it possible to utilize larger wind turbine generators up to 5MW, 6MW and 
10MW, and therefore possible to produce energy at a much higher capacity and yield compared 
to onshore. There is plenty of space, less noise restrictions and no visibility from shore.  
 
The potential for wind energy production offshore is estimated at 100,000 TWh per year 
worldwide, more than five times the present global electricity production. A large 1000 MW 
offshore wind farm consisting of 200 5MW turbines can produce more than 4 TWh a year. That 
is roughly equivalent to the annual electricity consumption of 850,000 average European 
households. The Norwegian energy agency Enova estimated the physical potential from 
offshore wind energy in Norwegian Sea areas alone to be about 14,000 TWh a year. By 
comparison, Norway’s annual electricity consumption stands at 125 TWh10.  
 
Larger turbines, deep waters and harsh weather conditions make it more complex to construct, 
transport and install wind farms offshore11. Statoil used NOK 400 million to get up their pilot, 
Hywind. The oil and gas company, Statoil ASA, is one of the Nordic countries largest groups 
                                               
 
9
 http://www.pressherald.com/news/PUC-approves-maine-statoil-wind-turbine-offshore-
deepwater.html?pagenum=full retrieved 06.06.2013. 
10
 http://www.norwind.no/en/Topmenu/About-Us/About-offshore-wind-energy.aspx retrieved 05.05.2013 
11
http://www.norwind.no/en/Topmenu/About-Us/About-offshore-wind-energy.aspx retrieved 05.05.2013 
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and the world's largest offshore operator12, not many entrepreneurial firms have the same ability 
to fund such an expensive project13, especially not with a financial crisis and a recession going 
on.  
 
In Norway there are several public institutions that contribute with funding to help 
entrepreneurial firms realize their ideas. Among them are Innovation Norway, the Norwegian 
Research Council and Enova, who work together to promote research and technology 
development aimed against future energy solutions14. Common for all the public funding 
schemes is that it requires the firm to contribute with equity to get the additional funding15. The 
Norwegian Research Council, for instance, has a program called RENERGI (CleanEnergy). It 
helps fund R&D projects within renewable energy where companies collaborate with each other 
or research institutions to develop new knowledge and new solutions. For firms doing innovation 
projects, RENERGI can offer support up to 30-50% of approved project costs. Research 
institutions that collaborate with businesses can gain up to 80% support16.  
 
The ongoing recession, triggered by the financial crisis in USA in 2007, is considered the most 
severe recession since the Great Depression of the 1930’s (Papaoikonomou et al., 2012, 
Claessens et al., 2009), but while recessions may be triggered by events in a single sector, its 
effects are usually widespread (Lilien and Srinivasan, 2010). Internationally, renewable 
                                               
 
12
http://e24.no/naeringsliv/dette-er-norges-ti-stoerste-selskaper/20266605 retrieved 07.06.2013. 
13
http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/energi-og-miljo/Finansiering/teknologiutvikling/ retrieved 02.06.2013. 
14
http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/PageFiles/15438/Fornybar%20energi%20og%20energieffektivisering.pd
f retrieved 02.06.2013. 
15
 http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/energi-og-miljo/Finansiering/teknologiutvikling/  retrieved 02.06.2013. 
16
http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/PageFiles/15438/Fornybar%20energi%20og%20energieffektivisering.pd
f retrieved 02.06.2013. 
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investments were hit hard by the financial crisis from autumn 2008. The really major downturn 
began in the first quarter of 2009, when the new financial investment fell to $ 13.3 billion, a 
decrease of 53% compared with the same period in 200817.  
 
Offshore wind is in Norway positioned between hydropower and petroleum. With the energy 
policy, offshore wind competes with hydropower in terms of KWh and with industrial policy; 
offshore wind competes with the petroleum industry to get the funding18. With new found oil, 
higher oil prices19 and a struggling renewable energy industry, the essential funding became 
less available to the new offshore wind industry. And with a minimum 50% requirement of self-
financing and cost up to NOK 400 million for one turbine, not many entrepreneurial firms were 
able to continue their original business.  
 
2.2 Literature review 
In short, recessions cause lowered sales, decreased margins, and reduced credit, yielding 
significant shocks to the resources available to the firm, thus threatening its survival (Pearce II 
and Michael, 2006). With customers decreasing their purchases, lenders lending less and 
investors investing less, things can seem very hopeless. Many firms do not see any other 
alternative than to give up and close the shop. How can the decision maker make his firms 
survive when everyone seems to be struggling, the money is running out and the moral in the 
                                               
 
17
 http://www.oreec.no/arch/_img/9081244.pdf retrieved 08.06.2013. 
18
 http://www.ntnu.no/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=183aca23-503d-4923-9617-
25c78bfcfef3&groupId=7414984 retrieved 07.06.2013. 
19
 http://energiogklima.no/kommentar-analyse/mulighetene-som-druknet-i-olje/ retrieved 10.06.2013. 
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whole company is sinking? Should they respond by cutting prices, change the product or 
partner-up with someone? How do the firm best get through?  
 
To understand differentials among ﬁrm’s performance, strategic management examines ﬁrm’s 
efforts to develop sustainable competitive advantages as a determinant of their ability to create 
wealth (De Carolis, 2003; Rouse & Dallenbach, 1999). Favorable market positions (Porter, 
1985) and the possession of valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and nonsubstitutable resources 
idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm (Barney, 1991) are the most frequently cited sources of sustainable 
competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2003). According to Ireland et al. (2003) recent arguments 
suggested that the most important competitive advantages are based on resources that are 
more valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and nonsubstitutable than those held by competitors 
(Gove, Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). These factors are important for a firm’s performance, however 
during periods of recession it is not necessarily enough to make it through. As few studies are 
devoted to help guide entrepreneurial firms survive a recession (Pearce II and Michael, 2006, 
Pearce II and Michael, 1997, Papaoikonomou et al., 2012, Parker, 2012), this thesis looks to a 
research field on a group that is experts in finding good opportunities; the entrepreneurs.  
 
Entrepreneurship and strategic management are both concerned with growth and wealth 
creation (Amit & Zott, 2001; Hitt & Ireland, 2000; Hitt, Ireland, Camp & Sexton, 2001, 2002; 
Ireland, Hitt, Camp & Sexton, 2001; Morris, 1998; Priem & Butler, 2001b), although their foci 
differ slightly. Strategic management is concerned with understanding the reasons for 
differentials among ﬁrm’s wealth creation in various economies (Farjoun, 2002; Teece, Pisano & 
Shuen, 1997 as cited in Ireland et al., 2003). Recognition and development of new opportunities 
are at the heart of entrepreneurship (Tang et al., 2012). Similar to Ireland et al. (2003) this 
12 
 
thesis does not assume nor argue that entrepreneurship and strategic management are a single 
discipline that has been subdivided, but complementary disciplines. 
 
2.2.1 Finding opportunities 
Opportunities are not simply found. There are many different theories of how opportunities come 
into being. Vaghely and Julien (2010) sums up some of the theories: According to Shane (2000) 
opportunities are discovered; Baron (2004, 2006) says that they are recognized; they are 
enacted through retrospective sensemaking according to Gartner et al. (2003); socially 
constructed say Sarason et al. (2005) and constructed and intentionally perceived according to 
Kruger (2000, 2003). Ardichvili et al. (2003) claim that while elements of opportunities may be 
‘‘recognized,’’ opportunities are made, not found. 
 
Sarasvathy et al. (2010) describe opportunity recognition, opportunity discovery, and also a 
third, opportunity creation: 
1. Opportunity Recognition is described as when both sources of supply and demand 
exist rather obviously, but has to be “recognized” and matched-up. Recognition is about 
the exploitation of the existing market and can include taking advantage of arbitrage 
possibilities or starting a franchise. Introduction of wind turbines in shallow water can be 
said to be an example of this. One recognized that the wind turbines used on land also 
could be used in the water without major alterations.  
 
2. Opportunity Discovery is when only one side exists, that is demand exists, but supply 
does not, and vice versa. In these cases the non-existence side has to be “discovered” 
before the match-up can be implemented. An example of this is cure for diseases. 
Demand exists, but not supply, it has to be discovered. Bottom-mounted offshore 
13 
 
turbines in deep water can be placed in this category or in the next, dependent on the 
country’s need for power. One recognized a market for more clean power, but had to 
discover and develop new solutions for how to place turbines in deep water to take 
advantage of the opportunity.  
 
3. Opportunity Creation is described as the situation where neither supply nor demand 
exist in an obvious manner, one or both have to be “created”, and several economic 
inventions in marketing, financing etc. have to be made for the opportunity to come into 
existence. An example of this is the light bulb. People first had to get electricity to be 
able to use this invention.  
 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000) has received extraordinary following (Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 
2012). According to Shane and Venkataraman (2000) human beings all possess different stocks 
of information and these stocks of information influence their ability to recognize particular 
opportunities. Stocks of information create mental schemas, which provide a framework for 
recognizing new information. Shane and Venkataraman (2000) state that the reason why some 
people will discover opportunities while others will not is contingent on two issues: “(1) the 
possession of prior information necessary to identify an opportunity and (2) the cognitive 
properties necessary to value it.” That is, to recognize an opportunity, an entrepreneur has to 
have prior information that is complementary with the new information, which triggers an 
entrepreneurial conjecture (Kaish and Gilad, 1991). This prior information might be about user 
needs (Von Hippel, 1986) or specific aspects of the production function (Bruderl, Preisendorfer, 
and Ziegler, 1992  as cited in Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
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Alertness 
Entrepreneurial alertness is a central part of theoretical models seeking to explain the  
identification of new opportunities (Tang et al., 2012). According to Kirzner (1973) the 
entrepreneur can be described as an active and creative person with special abilities 
(Landström, 1999). These special abilities include alertness, which he defines as an individual's 
ability to identify opportunities that are overlooked by others. It links skills, insights and 
awareness to the discovery of new opportunities (Tang et al., 2012). Kirzner (1979) developed 
the term “entrepreneurial alertness” as the ability to see where products (or services) do not 
exist or have unsuspectedly emerged as valuable. In other words, alertness exists when one 
individual has an insight into the value of a given resource when others do not. From this 
perspective, entrepreneurial alertness refers to “flashes of superior insight” that enable one to 
recognize an opportunity when it presents itself (Kirzner, 1979 as cited in Alvarez and Busenitz, 
2001).  
 
Tang et al. (2012) further develop the boundaries of alertness, and define it as consisting of 
three complementary elements: (1) Scanning and searching for information, (2) connecting 
previously-disparate information, and (3) making evaluations on the existence of profitable 
business opportunities. Building on Kirzner’s early theories, Tang et al. (2012) describe alert 
scanning and searching as constantly scanning the environment and searching for new 
information, changes, and shifts overlooked by others. Extending alertness as a part of the 
entrepreneurial cognition process (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2007), this 
dimension involves pre-existing knowledge, preparedness, and sensitivity to new opportunities. 
The second dimension, alert association and connection, involves pulling together disparate 
pieces of information and building them into coherent alternatives. This dimension corresponds 
with Kirzner's later work on alertness (1999) and addresses how individuals cognitively respond 
15 
 
to and process new information clues. Building on McMullen and Shepherd's (2006) recent 
work, Tang et al. (2012) suggest that the third dimension involves making evaluations and 
judgments about the new changes, shifts, or information and deciding if they would reﬂect a 
business opportunity with proﬁt potential.  
 
2.2.2 Different types of opportunities 
Entrepreneurial opportunities are those situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, 
and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of production 
(Casson, 1982 as cited in  Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Entrepreneurial opportunities differ 
from the larger set of all opportunities for profit, particularly opportunities to enhance the 
efficiency of existing goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods, because the 
former require the discovery of new means-ends relationships, whereas the latter involve 
optimization within existing means-ends frameworks (Kirzner, 1997 as cited in Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000).  
 
The entrepreneurial opportunities come in a variety of forms. Drucker (1985) has described 
three different categories of opportunities: (1) the creation of new information, as occurs with the 
invention of new technologies; (2) the exploitation of market inefficiencies that result from 
information asymmetry, as occurs across time and geography; and (3) the reaction to shifts in 
the relative costs and benefits of alternative uses for resources, as occurs with political, 
regulatory, or demographic changes (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
 
Based on prior literature Eckhardt and Shane (2003) also categories the different types of 
entrepreneurial opportunities into three groups. These categories are (1) by the locus of the 
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changes that generate the opportunity, (2) by the source of the opportunity and (3) by the 
initiator of the change. Eckhardt and Shane (2003) state that although most entrepreneurship 
research implicitly assumes that entrepreneurship involves changes in products or services, 
entrepreneurial opportunities can, in fact, occur as a result of changes in a variety of parts of the 
value chain. 
 
 Schumpeter (1934) suggested ﬁve different loci of these changes: those that stem from the 
creation of new products or services, those that stem from the discovery of new geographical 
markets, those that emerge from the creation or discovery of new raw materials, those that 
emerge from new methods of production and those that are generated from new ways of 
organizing. For instance; from the development of the internet, new modes of organizing that do 
not require bricks and mortar locations also generate opportunities for entrepreneurial proﬁt. 
Similarly, the discovery that seaweed could be sold as a food in the United States as well as 
Japan generates the opportunity for entrepreneurial activity, as did the discovery that oil 
provided a better fuel than many other raw materials previously discovered. New methods of 
production, such as the assembly line or computer-aided drug discovery, have also provided 
opportunities for entrepreneurial profit (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  
 
2.2.3 Source of opportunities 
Tang et al. (2012) claim that new opportunities may emerge as a result of prior experience, 
personal dispositions, from gaining specific information, being a frustrated user or changes in 
the broader environment. Recession does not necessary only have to be a bad thing, it creates 
many changes in the environment, and changes can often be a source of opportunities for the 
alert entrepreneur (Tang et al., 2012). 
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Eckhardt and Shane (2003) believe that prior research suggest four important ways of 
categorizing opportunities by sources. The first involves considering differences between 
opportunities that result from asymmetries in existing information between market participants, 
and opportunities that result from exogenous shocks of new information. The second 
comparison lies between supply and demand side opportunities. The third differentiates 
between productivity-enhancing and rent-seeking opportunities. The fourth lies in identifying the 
catalysts of change that generate the opportunities.  
 
Two major contributors to the field of entrepreneurship are Joseph A. Schumpeter and Israel 
Kirzner. They disagree over whether exogenous shocks are the primary catalyst of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Schumpeter (1934) held that periods of market efficiency are 
punctuated by periods of upheaval. Changes in technology, regulation, and other factors 
generate new information about how resources might be used differently. This information 
changes the price for resources, thereby allowing economic actors who have early access to the 
new information to purchase resources at low prices, use the information to create products or 
services and sell them at an entrepreneurial proﬁt (Schumpteter, 1934; Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000 as cited in Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). In contrast, Kirzner (1973, 1985, 1997) holds that 
opportunities exist even in the absence of this new information. In the absence of prices, he 
argues, people form beliefs in response to information they possess. Because those beliefs are 
inﬂuenced by a wide variety of ceaselessly changing factors, they are never 100% accurate. As 
a result, market actors make mistakes in their decisions, creating shortages and surpluses of 
resources (Gaglio and Katz, 2001). People alert to these mistakes can obtain resources and 
use them to create a proﬁtable new product or service (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000 as 
cited in Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  
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Existing research describes several dimensions of opportunities that result from exogenous 
shifts in information. Exogenous shifts include shifts like those spurred by government action, 
those triggered by demographic changes, and those generated by the creation of new 
knowledge. The exercise of government power influences the volume, distribution and types of 
opportunities available (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  
 
According to Eckhardt and Shane (2003) the most researched exogenous shift is that catalyzed 
by the creation of new knowledge. New knowledge creates the opportunity for entrepreneurs to 
create new goods, to introduce new methods of production, to utilize new sources of supply, to 
restructure industries, and to create new markets in new regions (Schumpeter, 1934) by 
replenishing the pool of opportunities that is drawn upon by entrepreneurs in their pursuit of 
profit (Klevorick, Levin, Nelson & Winter, 1995 as cited in Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  
 
The nature of the knowledge itself is likely to influence the volume and type of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Knowledge may be either generic or specific to a single application. Moreover, it 
may be tacit or codiﬁable, and it may draw on the integration of multiple technological ﬁelds and 
disciplines. Knowledge may also be easily isolated or it may be imbedded in a complex system 
and therefore not well understood (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1997). In all cases, the knowledge 
characteristics of industry may help determine the types and volume of opportunities available 
for discovery and exploitation (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). 
 
Another important source of opportunities is information asymmetries. Drucker (1985) discusses 
four sub-sets of opportunities based on information asymmetries: Firstly, incongruities may exist 
between micro-level behavior and macro-level outcomes. For example, an industry might face 
macro-level inefficient allocation of resources, such as investments in large-scale production 
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facilities that serve markets with cyclical demand. These cyclical enterprises are frequently 
accompanied by rising demand and poor performance, are typically proﬁtable only at peak 
points in the industry cycle, and therefore signal that a superior business model or production 
plan may be more proﬁtable (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). Secondly, Drucker state that 
incongruities may exist between realities of an industry and generally accepted assumptions 
about it. For example, a widespread belief may exist that the key to increasing ﬁrm performance 
is to invest in a speciﬁc technology. However, such a relationship may not exist; creating an 
opportunity for those that recognize that expected performance increases are not materializing. 
Widespread unproﬁtable investments in vehicle efficiency instead of improvements in logistical 
technology in the shipping industry are an example of such an opportunity (Drucker, 1985 as 
cited in Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). Thirdly, incongruities may exist between the efforts of an 
industry and the particulars of consumer demand. In this case, ﬁrms fail to recognize that latent 
demand exists for only minor medications to existing products, or for an overlooked 
demographic group. As a result, opportunities exist to simply do what other people have failed 
to do because of the latter’s cognitive errors. Lastly, internal incongruities may exist within the 
rhythm or the logic of a key industry process. In this case, opportunities exist for improving key 
steps in industry routines that have been perpetuated without question. An opportunity exits if 
entrepreneurs can transfer the process improvement to the focal industry (Drucker, 1985; Levin 
et al., 1987 as cited in Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). 
 
Supply vs. demand side changes 
Opportunities can be classified on whether the changes that generate them exist on the demand 
or the supply side. In general, the entrepreneurship literature implicitly focuses on the supply 
side. Changes in demand alone however, can generate opportunities. Customer preferences 
influence the allocation of resources because producers need to respond to the preferences and 
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purchasing habit of consumers. Thus, demand changes from exogenous shifts in culture, 
perception, tastes, or mood can open up opportunities (Kirzner, 1997; Schumpeter, 1934 as 
cited in Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). 
 
Productivity-enhancing vs. rent-seeking opportunities 
According to Eckhardt and Shane (2003) much of what researchers imply when they discuss 
entrepreneurship is productive entrepreneurship. In the standard view, the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial opportunity has productivity-enhancing outcomes, as economies are made more 
efficient. However, it is also possible to think of entrepreneurial actions as private rent-seeking, 
which Baumol (1990) has deﬁned as opportunities that generate personal value, but no social 
value. He points out several types of entrepreneurial opportunities that are not productivity-
enhancing, including crime, piracy, and corruption. Merger activity also provides a good 
example of the potential for both productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, if a merger 
merely shifts wealth from consumers to producers by reducing competition (Eckhardt and 
Shane, 2003).  
 
Initiator of the change 
Eckhardt and Shane (2003) classify opportunities based on the actor that initiates the change. 
Different types of entities initiate the changes, which result in entrepreneurial opportunities, and 
the type of initiator is likely to inﬂuence the process of discovery as well as the value and 
duration of the opportunities. Among the different types of actors that researchers have 
identified are non-commercial entities, such as governments or universities; existing commercial 
entities in an industry, such as incumbents and their suppliers and customers; and new 
commercial entities in an industry such as independent entrepreneurs and diversifying entrants 
(Klevorick et al., 1995 as cited in Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). 
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2.2.4 Exploiting opportunities  
The exploitation of an opportunity refers to those activities and investments committed to gain 
returns from the new product arising from the opportunity through the building of efficient 
business systems for full scale operations (Choi and Shepherd, 2004).  
 
Ardichvili et al. (2003) state that (1) entrepreneurial alertness, (2) information asymmetry, (3) 
social networks, (4) personality traits; including optimism, self-efficacy and creativity; and (5) the 
type of opportunity itself to be major factors that influence the opportunity recognition and 
development to business formation. Shane and Venkataraman (2000) also point out the 
characteristics of opportunities themselves as an important influential factor for people’s 
willingness to exploit them. Eckhardt and Shane (2003) claim that for an entrepreneur to exploit 
an opportunity, he or she must believe that the value of resources, used according to a 
particular means-ends framework, would be higher than if exploited in their current form. 
According to Shane and Venkataraman (2000) research has shown that, on average, 
entrepreneurs exploit opportunities having higher expected value. In particular, exploitation is 
more common when expected demand is large (Schmookler, 1966; Schumpeter, 1934), 
industry profit margins are high (Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson, 1988), the technology life cycle 
is young (Utterback, 1994), the density of competition in a particular opportunity space is neither 
too low nor too high (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), the cost of capital is low (Shane, 1996), and 
population-level learning from other entrants is available (Aldrich & Wiedenmeyer, 1993 as cited 
in Shane and Venkataraman, 2000)). Accordingly, the decision to exploit an opportunity involves 
weighing the value of the opportunity against the costs to generate that value and the costs to 
generate value in other ways. Thus, people consider the opportunity cost of pursuing alternative 
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activities in making the decision whether or not to exploit opportunities and pursue opportunities 
when their opportunity cost is lower (Amit, Mueller, & Cockburn, 1995; Reynolds, 1987 as cited 
in Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). In addition, people consider their costs for obtaining the 
resources necessary to exploit the opportunity. For example, Evans and Leighton (1989) 
showed that the exploitation of opportunities is more common when people have greater 
financial capital. Similarly, Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) reviewed research findings that showed 
that stronger social ties to resource providers facilitate the acquisition of resources and enhance 
the probability of opportunity exploitation (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
 
Ireland et al. (2003) also point out the firm’s financial standing when it comes to the exploitation 
of opportunities. From a strategic- or advantage-seeking behavior perspective, opportunities can 
be pursued only when the ﬁrm has the capabilities required to do so (De Carolis, 2003 as cited 
in Ireland et al., 2003). Ireland et al. (2003) suggest making an opportunity register where the 
ﬁrm records entrepreneurial opportunities. Placing all opportunities into a register makes them 
visible to multiple parties, some of whom already possess the capabilities needed to pursue 
them. Thus, opportunities identified by those in one part of the ﬁrm can be exploited by those 
working in other divisions or units in which the opportunities may be more valuable (Ireland et 
al., 2003). It can also be useful in prioritizing which ones to pursue, when one cannot afford to 
do them all.  
 
Choi and Shepherd (2004) analysis of a sample of entrepreneurs whose businesses are located 
in incubators suggests that entrepreneurs are more likely to exploit opportunities when they 
perceive more knowledge of customer demand for the new product, more fully developed 
necessary technologies, greater managerial capability, and greater stakeholder support.  
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Timing is also essential for the exploitation decision. Firms following a prospector strategy 
(Miles & Snow, 1978) are focused on assessing and using entrepreneurial opportunities to act 
quickly while a ﬁrm following a defender strategy is more concerned about the precise timing of 
exploiting an entrepreneurial opportunity (Ireland et al., 2003). According to Choi and Shepherd 
(2004) research, entrepreneurs can exploit the opportunity as fast as possible to lengthen their 
lead time. Lead time refers to the period of monopoly for the ﬁrst entrant prior to competitors 
entering the industry. Lengthening one’s lead time can generate important performance 
beneﬁts, including helping the ﬁrm strengthen its brand name (Schmalensee, 1982), broaden its 
product line (Robinson & Fornell, 1985), achieve cost advantages through experience effects 
(Abell & Hammond, 1979), and maintain higher margins in the absence of price competition 
(Porter, 1985). Alternatively, entrepreneurs can take time and gather information to reduce 
uncertainties and build the ﬁrm’s resources and capabilities before making the decision to enter 
the market and exploit the opportunity (Choi and Shepherd, 2004). 
 
2.3 Opportunities in recession 
John A. Pearce II and Steven C. Michael (1997, 2006) are two of the few authors that write 
about how entrepreneurial firms can become more recession resistant. They claim that a firm 
with emphasis on marketing as opposed to other business functions is more likely to become 
aware of the recession, to make necessary internal adjustments, and to identify and pursue 
external opportunities (Pearce II and Michael, 1997).  
 
With a better understanding of the origin and types of opportunities, one now should be better 
able at recognizing and discovering opportunities. The following sections discuss what the 
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perception of recession entails and presents some of the opportunities that may be found in 
recession, and lastly this section finishes with a short summary.  
 
2.3.1 Opportunity or threat? 
A crisis can be perceived both as a threat and as an opportunity (Penrose, 2000). Sarasvathy, 
Simon, and Lave (1998) have shown that successful entrepreneurs see opportunities in 
situations in which other people tend to see risks (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). In the 
context of environmental change, like a recession, those with an entrepreneurial cognition often 
see new opportunities where others tend to be concerned with protecting themselves from 
emerging threats and changes (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  
 
Research by Dutton and Duncan (1987) and Dutton and Jackson (1987) suggest that how an 
organization perceives a change in the environment, significantly affects both the level and the 
type of response. Accordingly, firms that view a recession as an opportunity perceive that they 
have control over both the situation and the resultant outcome, and therefore, invest during the 
recession (e.g., building marketing assets). The firms that consider the recession a threat, 
perceive a lack of control over the situation and the resultant outcome, and respond by 
conserving resources (Srinivasan et al., 2005). 
 
Big investments during a recession are very risky (Srinivasan et al., 2005). No recession is the 
same, both the duration and amplitude of each business cycle and its movements vary 
substantially; as fingerprints - no two are alike (Bromiley et al., 2008). It is hard for anyone to tell 
how long it is going to last. One may expect the recession to soon be over, be surprised that it is 
heading in the wrong direction and be stuck with products or equipment it is impossible to sell 
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and costly to hold. In order to detect opportunities and threats Pearce II and Michael (1997, 
2006) suggest that the entrepreneurial firm must engage in constant scanning for information 
about the macroeconomic environment, as well as industry and competitive conditions in a cost-
effective manner.  
 
2.3.2 Changes in demand 
As mention earlier, opportunities can be classified on whether the changes that generate them 
exist on the demand or the supply side (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). During periods of 
recession consumers generally have less money to spend and cut back personal spending in 
response to the overall decline in economic activity (Pearce II and Michael, 2006), as a 
consequence demand is likely to go down for many high-end products. In terms with 
microeconomics and the product’s income elasticity, consumers may demand cheaper products 
instead of the high-end products due to lowered income (Case and Fair, 2007). This can create 
opportunities for new low-end products.  
 
2.3.3 Collaborate 
Reaves and Deimler (2009) propose a number of strategies to gain competitive advantage in 
times of recession. Partnership with the competitors is one of them (Papaoikonomou et al., 
2012). Opportunities can be created by combining the different firm’s products, which can lead 
to a decreased need for investors help, or make the total product seem better and less risky, so 
investors dare to invest after all.  
 
Networking. During recessions your network becomes even more important. Alvarez and 
Busenitz (2001) argue that involvement by entrepreneurs in distant and varied social 
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interactions facilitates the gathering of diverse, unusual, and sometimes specific information. It 
can lead to exposure to chaotic bits of information that sometimes get combined in usual ways 
and sometimes lead to new endeavors (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). As resources are scarce, 
investments dry up and customers spend less, the network you have can be used to find others 
in the same situation. A collaboration or a partnership, whether it is with the competition, 
suppliers, producers of substitutes or customers can give access to desperately needed 
resources or help you recognize and discover new opportunities.  
 
Burt (2000) alleged that you through a good network can get exposure to an opportunity, access 
to information, referrals, sharing of resources and knowledge (financial and human capital), and 
at a critical time (Papaoikonomou et al., 2012, Burt, 2000). Pearce II and Michael (1997) do also 
point out the importance of information, and claim that it plays a crucial role in helping 
entrepreneurial firms survive recession. The information, or the lack of it, creates opportunities 
(Pearce II and Michael, 1997). According to Burt (2000) a well-structured network does not only 
give access to the critical information, it also gives control and advantages in negotiation 
settings.  
 
2.3.4 Flexibility 
One of the advantages of the entrepreneurial firm is its greater flexibility (Pearce II and Michael, 
1997). Pearce II and Michael (1997) claim that through marketing activities the small 
entrepreneurial firm is likely to remain knowledgeable about customer needs, and the flexibility 
makes it able to adjust production more rapidly than the larger competitors. 
 
2.3.5 Adapt 
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Realizing the change in needs due to the recession and being able to adapt to those needs 
faster than the competitor can create many opportunities. According to Alvarez and Busenitz 
(2001) entrepreneur’s heuristic-based logic appears to give them a competitive advantage in 
quickly learning about new changes and what the implication of those changes are for the 
development of specific discoveries. Entrepreneurial firms perform well in hostile and uncertain 
environments partly because they adapt their efforts to the prevailing conditions and seek 
competitive advantage by taking risks in such environments (Covin & Slevin, 1989 as cited in 
Srinivasan et al., 2005) 
 
2.3.6 Introduction of new products 
In times of recession, Pearce II and Michael (2006) claim competitors are relatively “quiet”. 
Hence, a recession can be an especially effective time to introduce new products because the 
availability of advertising and distribution may help a fledgling product capture customer loyalty 
early (Pearce II and Michael, 2006). Pearce II and Michael (2006) also highlight the fact that 
many customers claim they buy less during recessions since companies introduce less 
innovations in their product lines. 
 
What kind of products should one introduce? 
A recession affects different industries differently (Pearce II and Michael, 2006). Knowing how, 
can help you recognize and discover opportunities. Pearce II and Michael (2006) describe a 
cyclic industry as an industry where sales coincide with the phases of the business cycle. In a 
recession, a cyclical industry is characterized by stable or falling prices, decreases in real 
earnings, excess production capabilities and high unemployment. Examples of cyclical 
industries include durable goods manufacturers such as auto makers, producers of apparel and 
other textile products, producers of paper and paperboard mills, computer manufacturers, home 
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builders, and industries such as real estate, travel, media and electronics (Pearce II and 
Michael, 2006).  
 
According to Pearce II and Michael (2006) there are also counter-cyclical and non-cyclical 
industries. The counter-cyclical industries experience increased sales during recessions. While 
rare, such industries include insurance, food, home remodeling and maintenance, and alcoholic 
beverages. The performance of non-cyclical industries is unrelated to the state of the economy. 
During periods of recession, consumer must continue their expenditures on necessity products 
such as food and health care. Other industries that perform well during recessions include 
accounting, auditing and bookkeeping services, soap, cleansers, and toiletries (Pearce II and 
Michael, 2006). 
 
2.3.7 Services  
According to Pearce & Michael (2006) people in recession get less willing to invest in new 
products and projects and prefer to fix or optimize what they have by using more services. GDP 
for services actually increased during the recessions with average severity (Pearce II and 
Michael, 2006). As consumers continue spending on services, you can use the recession and 
decreased product demand to introduce (more) service offerings, or offer solutions instead of 
just products. 
 
2.3.8 Multiple markets and geographies 
Recessions do not affect all places equally or simultaneously. Usually one region of the world is 
affected more than another. When the economy contracts in one part of the world, it usually 
expands, or at least is stable, in others (Pearce II and Michael, 2006). Recognizing that others 
29 
 
are in recession while your firm is not might be a source of opportunities. Your firm might be 
able to get quality resources and technology to highly reduced prices as those firms are 
struggling and trying to cut prices to attract and retain customers (Pearce II and Michael, 2006).  
 
Recession elsewhere may also give access to undervalued human resources. Rising 
unemployment that accompanies a recession deepens the pool of qualified labor and reduces 
wage pressures. Therefore, countercyclical hiring, hiring in times of downturns, allows 
organizations to staff a higher quality workforce at lower wages. In contrast, firms that continue 
to hire at premium wages in the late stages of an expansion may increase their cost structure 
relatively to firms that stop hiring or cut back on their workforce in anticipation of a recession 
(Bromiley et al., 2008). Bromiley et al. (2008) state that workers do not simply switch their jobs 
after being hired during a recession once the recovery ensures because of a “status quo 
tendency” in decision-making (e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Silver and Mitchell, 
1990), while March and Simon (1958) argue that satisfied workers do not search for information 
on other employment.  
 
2.3.9 Acquisition and mergers 
Companies acquire other companies for many reasons – to eliminate a rival and boost pricing 
power, to secure an important factor input, to achieve economies of scale in production or 
marketing, and so on. Regardless of the purpose of an acquisition, its performance depends on 
the purchase price. If stock price relative to firm value varies over the course of the business 
cycle (as co-movements of the stock market and business cycle suggest), firm that acquire 
when price to value is low should benefit relative to those that buy when price to value is high 
(Bromiley et al., 2008). 
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If your firm is in good financial standing and looking for expansion possibilities, a recession can 
be a time for bargains. During a recession, acquisition targets are likely to be weakened, and 
therefore less expensive. Competitors are also less likely to jump into the bidding process. As a 
result, growth and expansion through acquisition may become less expensive during a 
recession and, ultimately, more profitable (Pearce II and Michael, 2006).  
 
According to Eckhardt and Shane (2003) a merger or break-up of ﬁrms can also lead to change 
in resource use and create productive opportunities as new customer relationships or 
economies of scale are generated.  
 
2.4 Discussion - Literature in context of recession and offshore wind 
2.4.1 Assumptions 
According to Eckhardt and Shane (2003) for the past 30 years, the dominant theories in 
entrepreneurship have sought to explain entrepreneurship as a function of the types of people 
engaged in entrepreneurial activity and, as a result, have largely overlooked the role of 
opportunities. Eckhardt and Shane (2003) suggests a shift away from the ”entrepreneurial type” 
paradigm and other types of people to a paradigm of entrepreneurship that is embedded in the 
concept of disequilibrium and incomplete information about opportunities. They state that use of 
their framework can be used to test central questions about the discovery, evaluation and 
exploitation of opportunities. And as this thesis focus on opportunities, it assumes a state of 
disequilibrium according to their framework and focuses on the opportunities itself. (For theories 
regarding equilibrium and the people involved see e.g. Schumpeter (1934) and Kirzner (1973)) 
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Srinivasan et al. (2005) state that the greater the perceived severity of the recession, the fewer 
the choices managers have in responding to the recession, and therefore, are less likely to treat 
the recession as an opportunity. The current recession is the most severe since the 1930’s, it is 
therefore likely that the managers of the entrepreneurial firms in this thesis see few 
opportunities. 
 
2.4.2 Opportunity recognition, discovery or creation 
Cohen and Winn (2007) state that given that demand for alternatives to the over-utilization of 
natural resources cannot be easily predicted ex-ante and that supply of alternative technologies 
to harness renewable resources (such as wind, water, hydroelectric, or solar) are not widely 
commercially available, entrepreneurs addressing this market imperfection are likely to do so 
through opportunity "creation" (i.e. creating new markets). In Norway the power demand is 
almost 100% covered by hydro power20, it is an old and mature market. Land based wind and 
wind power in shallow water can also be said to be mature. Both wind in deep water and floating 
wind are said to be immature both in term of market and technology and can thus be 
categorized into this last group of opportunity creation. In the Norwegian context, the technology 
for offshore wind turbines had to be developed, and before the consumer can start using this 
power, grids of underwater power lines have to be laid out. There is no direct need for offshore 
wind, and thus not only the technology has to be created, the market also needs to be. 
 
2.4.3 Exogenous shifts-based opportunities 
                                               
 
20
 http://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Representantforslag/2011-
2012/dok8-201112-112/1/ retrieved 06.06.13.  
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As mentioned, exogenous shifts include shifts like those spurred by government action. The 
exercise of government power influences the volume, distribution and types of opportunities 
available (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). This is clear in the case of the offshore wind industry in 
Norway. In 2009 and 2010 the industry was blooming, but with the found of new oil and new 
politicians in charge, the situation now are completely different. While former Oil and energy 
minister Terje Riis-Johansen believed in the industry and stated multiple times in 2009 and 2010 
that offshore wind power could become Norway’s next industry and energy adventure (Hansen 
and Steen, 2011), many firms saw potential in this new industry and started developing 
solutions. The current Oil and energy minister Ola Borten Moe have a much stronger focus 
towards the oil and gas industry, an suggest less support to the wind industry and rater focus on 
capturing and storage of CO221. The opportunities is said to have drowned in oil22. 
 
2.4.4 Exploitation 
What action is the best? There are many dependencies. The firm’s market share, industry, 
product-market profile and financial leverage for instance (Lilien and Srinivasan, 2010). For 
firms with strong financial standing before the recession, an aggressive strategy may be the 
best choice; think about cyclist in the Tour de France - the fittest and strongest do not attack on 
the flat or early in the race but attack on the roughest, steepest, most grueling sections. 
Attacking when times are tough allows them to separate themselves from the weaker cyclist and 
provides them a return later on (Lilien and Srinivasan, 2010). Lilien and Srinivasan (2010) claim 
their research show that weaker firms can try to keep up with the strongest (trying to chase the 
                                               
 
21
 http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Borten-Moe-vil-kutte-subsidiering-av-fornybar-energi-
7230055.html retrived 25.06.2013. 
22
 http://energiogklima.no/kommentar-analyse/mulighetene-som-druknet-i-olje/ retrieved 10.06.2013. 
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stronger cyclists in tough conditions) and risk out-and-out failure or they can conserve energy 
for a reasonable finish. Accordingly, the strong (those with the skill, the will and the till (money 
that is)), should invest in franchise building activities, such as new product development and 
brand enhancement, during the recession, while the less strong should focus on securing core 
customers and markets for the long haul (Lilien and Srinivasan, 2010).  
 
2.5 Summary 
To sum up, when it comes to opportunities, theory suggests that entrepreneurial firms can 
become successful or survive periods of recession by: 
 
1. Perceiving the recession as an opportunity instead of a threat (Alvarez and Busenitz, 
2001, Srinivasan et al., 2005) 
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, suppliers or 
others  (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001, Papaoikonomou et al., 2012, Burt, 2000, Eckhardt 
and Shane, 2003) 
 
3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes (Pearce II and 
Michael, 1997, Srinivasan et al., 2005, Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). 
 
4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s) (Pearce II and Michael, 
2006).  
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5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the recession 
(Pearce II and Michael, 2006, Bromiley et al., 2008).  
 
How do entrepreneurial firm perceive a recession, are they able to see opportunities regarding 
these issues or are there other element they see as more important? And have they seen these 
opportunities as important enough to take action? In light of this thesis’ research question, it 
uses these five takeaway points as framework for further investigation of entrepreneurial firm’s 
opportunities in recession.   
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Selection of method 
The focus for this thesis is how entrepreneurial firms perceive and act upon opportunities in 
times of recession to learn about ways to get through it. To investigate this, this thesis take a 
look at an industry that is experiencing recession, the offshore wind energy industry in Norway. 
Many writers emphasize the importance of the entrepreneurial firm, but few have devoted 
research to help guide entrepreneurial firms through the tough periods of recession (Pearce II 
and Michael, 2006, Pearce II and Michael, 1997, Papaoikonomou et al., 2012, Parker, 2012). 
There is also scarcity of studies of opportunity, both theoretical and empirically, with the 
overwhelming majority of studies focusing on the individual or firm (see Eckhardt and Shane, 
2003; Venkataraman, 1997 as cited in  Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012). A recent review of the 
literature only found a handful of studies that empirically addressed opportunities and 
opportunity discovery (Dimov, Forthcoming as cited in Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012). This thesis 
combines the two fields in an effort to help entrepreneurial firms survive recession. Eisenhardt 
(1989) emphasize that a qualitative approach can make a significant contribution to theory 
development when key themes are weakly developed, and so it is in this case. And according to 
Yin (2008) case studies are the preferred method when (a) “how” or “why” questions are being 
posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real-life context. This thesis look at a typical how-question; how 
entrepreneurial firms perceive and act upon opportunities, and it is a contemporary 
phenomenon; it is in the case of recession. As an investigator, this thesis has no control of 
people’s perception or how the firms have acted; it is not something that could be investigate 
with experiments in a lab. As some of the firms have gone under, direct observation to get an 
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understanding of their perception and action would be impossible. Survey would probably leave 
out dependencies and would not give a real in-depth understanding. Histories are the preferred 
method when there is virtually no access or control (Yin, 2008), but as this thesis had access to 
firms that experienced recession, and sources of data online, case study and in-depth 
interviews was deemed the best suited choice for research.  
 
3.2 Case selection 
Case selection started with all renewable energy industries, except hydropower, as it is such a 
strong and established industry in Norway. Power in itself can be said to be a non-cyclic 
product; demand for power is relatively stable from year to year. The hydropower industry is 
therefore not likely to be much influenced by recession. New and not strongly established 
industries, which still are in the development stage, and highly dependent on investments on the 
other hand, are likely to be strongly affected by the business cycle and its downturns. This is 
because investments that can be deferred or abstained often is during a recession, in addition, 
credit becomes less available from banks due to the increased risk (Pearce II and Michael, 
2006). The offshore wind industry, and particularly floating wind and bottom-mounted in deep 
water, are still immature both in terms of technology and market (Volden et al., 2009a). 
Entrepreneurial firms in this industry, a new industrial production industry, will therefore be a 
typical group affected by the common business cycle and its downturns. The selection of 
companies in one industry, the offshore wind industry, was made to more easily compare the 
companies to each other, as they have nearly the same conditions for recognizing and 
exploiting opportunities.  
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Eisenhardt (1989) points out that random selection are not necessary, and not even desirable, 
when doing case studies. In term with the arguments above, this thesis used these five criteria 
for selection of the entrepreneurial firms:  
1. Connected to the offshore wind industry 
2. Relatively new, but not so new that the firm did not go through the financial crisis; i.e. 
established before or under the crisis, but not earlier than year 2000 
3. Established in Norway 
4. Focus or producers of new technology 
5. Focus on company growth 
 
Finding firms that fulfilled these criteria was done through aid from experts in the renewable 
energy field, my supervisor, and with use of company registration web-pages such as Proff.no, 
Forvalt.no, Purehelp.no and Brreg.no. These company registration web-pages provides 
company details like time of establishment, employment, the income statement, balance sheet, 
the companies’ shareholders and subsidiaries. The companies own web-pages, the industry 
newspaper Teknisk ukeblad (www.tu.no), and other newspapers have also been used to get 
firm insights for selection of companies, and for gaining in-depth insights into the offshore wind 
industry. In addition, this thesis have made sure to select firms in all technical groups; bottom-
mounted in shallow water, in deep water and floating. This thesis also took consideration to the 
firm’s level of success; firms with different level were chosen. Success was in this thesis 
measured by the firm’s activity level now – well into the recession. Two of the cases exist on 
paper, but are not active anymore; the other two are active, one with limited capacity, and one 
with full capacity. This was done to see if the maturity of the industry and success level seemed 
to influence their perception, ability to see opportunities and decisions to exploit. 
 
38 
 
3.3 Transferability  
The entrepreneurial firms, in this renewable energy industry, often have very high production 
cost on their products and little or no diversification. They focus on one core technology and 
costly products that takes years to develop, and are thus dependent on large investments to get 
their companies up and running. This makes the data transferable and relevant to many 
entrepreneurial firms, in other high cost type industries, experiencing recession. This includes 
for instance; manufacturers of machinery and equipment, firms in other renewable energy 
industries; e.g. solar energy, wave power, tidal power, ocean current or osmotic power.  
 
3.4 The interviews 
The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, and were all conducted within the month of 
May 2013. Two of the interviews were done through face-to-face interviews. The other two were 
done through use of video-calls; one with use of Skype and the other at the firm’s own 
conference video-room. In both cases of video-calls, the quality of sound and picture were good. 
Representing the firm were people with strong connection and knowledge of the firm’s situation 
through the past years; founders, CEO, general managers and board members.  
 
A long time was used beforehand to fully read into the firms. Their own web-pages were used, 
financial statement and all news articles where they had been mentioned. This was done to get 
a good understanding of their products, situation, to be able to ask appropriate additional 
questions and to have multiple sources of data.  
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This thesis used semi-structured interviews with open ended questions. Emphasis was placed 
on the interviewee telling their own story and using their own words. The questions were asked 
in an indirect way to not be leading.  
 
The interviews consisted of 3 parts. The first section was collection and confirmation of firm 
background information. The second part consisted originally of six open-ended questions, to 
get an understanding of their perception of recession, and the opportunities they saw. The third 
section addressed possible opportunities according to what theory suggests, and questions 
regarding how they followed up on the opportunities they saw. In all sections additional follow-
up detail question were asked, and the questions were adapted to their previous responses. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed afterwards to get a good grasp on the data, and to 
make sure the information was accurate interpreted when analyzed.  They were also asked if 
they wanted anonymity or not. As they did not, firm information is found in the following section 
of this thesis.  
 
3.5 Analysing  
Empirical research on entrepreneurship and business cycles is still in its infancy and research 
methodologies in this area remain under-developed at the time of writing (Parker, 2012). This 
thesis therefore uses its own framework based on several theories, as described in the previous 
chapter, when analyzing. The empirical results were drawn from the transcribed material on a 
case-by-case basis, according to the five points in the literature review. Additional empirical 
materials regarding the research questions were also included in this thesis. The cases were 
further analyzed and compared. The analyzing process cannot be seen as a linear. One of the 
strengths of undertaking qualitative research is the constant iteration between emerging 
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concepts, data and literature ( Yin 1984, Eisenhardt 1989, Miles and Huberman 1994 as cited in 
Sørheim, 2003). When analyzing, this thesis focused on similarities and dissimilarities between 
the cases, and particularities within firm at the same time; jumping back and forth. 
 
3.6 Weaknesses of the study 
According to Yin (2008) a major prejudices against the case study method is that it is influenced 
by the writers biased view. There is also a danger that respondents will try to rationalize their 
behavior, report a desirable response or try to put their firm in a better light. The respondent 
however, seemed to be intrigued by the subject of this thesis, and open-heartily shared their 
stories.  
 
Effort was put into not influencing the interviewee. This was done by dividing the interview in 
three sections, in a sense to not “give away the answers”, and by asking open-ended and not 
leading questions. The questions however, may also be criticized; having been too open, not 
highlighting the focus of opportunities enough.  
 
As the questions were regarding event in the past, there is always a possibility of retrospective 
bias, since people tend to remember past events in more favorable terms then they actually 
occurred in (Seidler, 1974). It is also likely that some of the opportunities the interviewee saw 
around the start of the recession in 2008 have been forgotten, thus narrowing the results.  
 
As the focus for this thesis is on opportunities, it has not included all theories and strategies as 
to how to overcome a recession. This means that there are some important elements, for how to 
better get through periods of recession, lacking in this thesis.  
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The study is done with a small sample of entrepreneurial firms in the offshore wind industry in 
Norway. Though they are in different fields of the industry, the cases in thesis can be criticized 
for being too similar and give to little basis for scientific generalization, as it only concentrates on 
one industry and because it consists of only 4 firms. Even though the firms are only in this one 
industry, they can be described as a very “typical” technical entrepreneurial companies when it 
comes to recession; the small size, its age, focusing on growth and new technology.  
 
Since all the interviews were conducted and transcribed in Norwegian, the data had to be 
translated into English before used in this thesis. This may have caused some errors in the 
following chapters, as some words or meanings might have been lost in translation.  
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4 Case study 
In this chapter the four case firms and the empirical results are presented. The results are then 
analysed case-by-case, compared to each other and discussed.  
4.1 Presentation of the case firms 
4.1.1 WindFlip AS 
“WindFlip is an innovative technology company based in Stavanger, Norway. With its novel 
technology WindFlip strives to deliver transportation and installation solutions in the global 
emerging market of offshore floating wind power. Described in its simplest form our solution is a 
barge that is able to transport a fully assembled turbine in horizontal position from onshore to 
the final installation location far off coast. At the installation site the turbine is launched by filling 
ballast tanks in a way that rotates the barge and turbine into vertical position.”23 
 
WindFlip AS started as a student start-up at Norwegian University of Science and Technology’s 
School of Entrepreneurship (NSE). Their original product is described in their own words above. 
The company was active between January 2008 and June 2012. During this time the company 
first had five students working for free and when they graduated, two of the team-members 
decided to continue and work full-time on developing the company and its product. They applied 
and received several grants; from Innovation Norway, and an IRD - Industrial research and 
development contract with Statoil, for development of a prototype in 1:45 scale. As one can see 
from their own description, the company belongs in the third technology group; the floating 
                                               
 
23
 http://www.windflip.com/organization.aspx retrived 18.06.13. 
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offshore wind group. The company is now hibernating in hope for the market to mature. With me 
for the interview was founder and general manager; Ane Christophersen. 
 
4.1.2 OceanWind AS  
“OceanWind was established in 2008 by Scatec (Alf Bjørseth) and Grieg Group to develop and 
plan offshore wind farms. The company focuses on the use of innovative technology that makes 
it possible to install fixed offshore turbines at water depths greater than 20 meters far from the 
coast”.24  
 
The company was established as a spin-off from its sister-company; Norwind AS. As one can 
see from their own description above, the focus is on the second technology group; the bottom-
mounted in deep water. The company employed five full-time employees in addition to some 
part-time employees hired in from the mother company; Scatec. Scatec is primarily a catalyst for 
new business ideas and an incubator for new technology companies within the renewable 
energy field.25 Due to OceanWind’s business model as product developers, the company had 
major expenses for several years before they expected to cash in on the investment. They 
started with some financing from their owners and were supposed to find additional investors. 
The financial crisis hit Norway and these became hard to find. Today the company still exist on 
paper, but there is no activity. The interview was conducted with the prior CEO, in the time 
period 2008 - 2010; Ivar Slengesol. 
                                               
 
24
 http://www.scatec.no/no/News/090320_MarineWind-Alliance-to-seek-UK-Offshore-wind-energy-
rights.aspx retrieved 15.05.2013. 
25
 http://www.scatec.no/no/Topmenu/Om-Scatec/Forretningsstruktur.aspx retrieved 15.05.2013. 
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4.2.3 WindSea AS 
“WindSea AS is developing, testing and plans commercialize a new, innovative offshore wind 
turbine platform. WindSea is owned by FORCE Technology and NLI, both leading players in 
their respective fields. WindSea is a new concept for offshore wind turbine platforms. The 
concept is being developed using the accumulated experience of the founders in the offshore 
industry. Issues particular to offshore wind turbine deployment such as fabrication, access, 
installation, and maintenance are effectively addressed by the WindSea design. The WindSea 
concept consists of a floating platform supporting 3 wind mills. The semi-submersible vessel is 
moored to the sea bottom with the mooring lines connected to a turret at the vessel geometric 
centre. This configuration allows the vessel to rotate. The vessel is therefore always able to 
orient the turbines optimally towards the incoming wind.”26 
 
One of the firm’s owners is FORCE Technology (FT) a Danish company. Denmark is well 
established and a strong actor within the wind industry, Norway is regarding the offshore 
industry. The opportunity to combine the two sets of expertise was recognized; and WindSea 
was established in 2008.27 Statkraft was in the beginning the majority owner, but today only FT 
and NLI remain. WindSea have according to general manager never had employees. WindSea 
have used the owner’s capabilities; temporarily hiring as needed. At most the company 
employed 10 full-time workers. The company is still running, dough with limited capacity. The 
                                               
 
26
 http://www.windsea.no/about-windsea/ retrieved 01.05.2013. 
27
 http://www.forvalt.no/foretaksindex2/firma/FirmaSide.aspx?orgnr=992796731 retrieved 18.06.2013. 
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company is in the third technology group; focusing on floating wind.  The interview was 
conducted with managing director of WindSea and FORCE Technology: Henning Arnøy. 
 
4.2.4 Blaaster Wind Technologies AS 
“Blaaster Wind Technologies is developing a direct-drive wind turbine concept that first will be 
realized in an onshore 3MW unit for all wind conditions. By Blaaster’s platform strategy, the 
turbines can also easily be realised in larger turbine sizes. The Blaaster turbines are based on 
the best experience of more than 15 years of wind power knowledge. The Blaaster concept is a 
low-maintenance concept, optimized for manufacturing around the world, easy road 
transportation over long distances and with a favourable all over weight not seen before on 
large direct-drive wind turbines. We are developing the next generation wind turbines. The 
ability of the vessel to rotate, leads to the advantage that the turbines do not need a traditional 
yaw-system that allows them to rotate individually. This reduces cost.”28 “Blaaster’s first 
prototype was installed summer 2012 at Valsneset test center in Norway. The head office of the 
company is in Trondheim, Norway.”29 
 
Behind the firm are Torolf Pettersen and his son Ove Pettersen, who previously developed and 
sold the firm ScanWind AS to General Electric (GE) in 2009. Today the firm employs 8 full-time 
employees. During the development of the prototype there were 12-15 in the stab; 20-25 
including the construction workers. The firm is active with full capacity. Blaaster focus on turbine 
                                               
 
28
 http://supplier.windcluster.no/public/profile/11 retrieved 20.06.2013. 
29
 http://www.blaaster.no/?page_id=2 retrieved 25.06.2013.  
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technology and are developing a turbine that can be used most places with small alterations, 
and can thus be placed in the first technology group; wind in shallow water. With me for the 
interview was Camilla Jørås Larsen. She is a board member, administration manager and 
daughter of the founder; Torolf Pettersen. 
 
4.2 Empirical findings  
4.2.1 WindFlip AS 
1. Perception 
When asked if they saw anything positive regarding the recession WindFlip highlighted that 
there became more public founding schemes available. “There became more money one could 
apply for” and “…there were more focus on start-ups. Focus on these firms making it, not from 
private hold, but from the government”. She said that it was a strong focus on renewable energy 
and many of these schemes had a focus on it too, but that there also came a package with 
more available funding as the waves of the financial crises hit Norway in 2009-2010. “It was a 
long time since Norway had found major oil founds and it was in a way much more focus on 
renewable energy”. She states; “the industry was “full steam ahead” and it was suppose to last 
to 2013, but then a great shift came”. Accordingly, the fact that the firm consisted of so young 
members was highlighted as something positive, and gave them extra attention in the media. 
Ane perceived the customers as lacking and things taking much longer time. She emphasized 
that the industry of floating offshore wind is very immature and that this made it very hard for 
them, as they had to wait for others firms to develop their product to be able to sell their own, 
and that the whole industry stopped moving forward. Ane believed good financial standing to be 
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essential to get through. “You have to have cash to get through a recession.” “It may be 
possible to get money during a recession, but as it is a crisis, demand on what you are 
delivering goes down, which makes it hard”. She said the public schemes were good but; “if you 
do not have a customer in the end saying we want this product, it will be hard to collect from 
investors or public funding.”  
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, 
suppliers or others  
According to Ane, the strategy was all along to gain a strong partner or being acquired. “To get 
a partner was really the strategy all along. We are a small firm in a very capital-intensive 
industry, so we have to get bigger players to back us up. Whether in the form of a joint venture 
or they integrating us fully, or joint venture project based, it is entirely dependent on the course 
of time, but we have to get a partner with us in the future.” Ane said WindFlip went actively out 
to all kinds of actors, mostly by phone calls; “everything from designers to operators, i.e. 
shipping companies, and tried to offer our product as part of their end-product to customers”. 
“The problem is that it was so long into the future, nobody needed to take a stand on it now, and 
thus we were not able to gain a partner at this time.” 
 
3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes  
Ane said they made several changes to the business model and their product; “We changed 
things all the time. When one talk to people, one get a better understanding of the industry and 
get an overview over the players involved and then one has to adapt to their needs.” When it 
comes to the technology Ane believe it to have very limited possibilities for adoptions. 
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Regarding flexibility and adaption she stated that “one has to be able to do something else in 
these times, when it is impossible to get financing, to be able to survive”. 
 
 
4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s)  
As they were struggling to sell and find partners, they changed their business model to include 
service. For ¾ of a year the two members of the firm worked as consultants. Ane stated that 
they took an active choice on the subject; if they wanted to continue as a duo and working as 
consultants or if they wanted to be employees in a bigger firm till the market became more 
mature. She believed that they could have kept the company going as a consultant agency, but 
it was not what they wanted. “We had the opportunity to adapt, and we did to a certain amount, 
we were doing it for almost a year, but we found out, it was not what we wanted continue doing.” 
“Our idea seems to be far in the future, 6-7 years and so we wanted to try something else in the 
meanwhile.” They hope to go back to their main product if and when the market becomes ready.  
 
5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the 
recession  
When asked if they saw any opportunities as the competition were struggling and pulling out, 
Ane said that they did not. “For us the biggest issue was all along that the market was very 
immature and there were very few competitors.”  
 
Regarding opportunities in other countries; Ane claimed that Norway was the leading country at 
the time. “The market is most mature in Norway, and it is very immature here.” “We are not on 
the wind field in general, only floating wind, and we do not deliver a wind mill, so we cannot go 
to Germany for instance, and say if you take a chance on us we can give you a park.” But 
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WindFlip had been in conversations with Japan. Accordingly, the problem is that “the technical 
solutions are not ready yet” and that Japan wants to be independent and produce their own 
solutions, “which means that it takes even longer time”. “It is of course a good opportunity if it is 
tough one place; look somewhere else”. 
 
When asked if they saw any other opportunities due to the recession Ane highlighted the extra 
attention they got “we did not notice in the beginning, but we notice later on when more and 
more companies went under and had to close down, you gain extra attention. But this was 
maybe closer to the end than the beginning, and by then, our firm was at the rim, so I do not 
believe it to be a great opportunity really”. She added that this extra attention also may have 
lead to greater support from public founding, i.e. Innovation Norway.  
 
Regarding taking action on the opportunities they saw, Ane believed that they had done so to 
the max. “We have gotten as much funding as we could have gotten, and developed the 
concept as far as possible, the way the company have been and regarding the maturity of the 
industry. I do not believe we could have done anything different, besides timing.” 
 
 
4.1.2 OceanWind AS 
1. Perception   
The positive, Ivar believes is that “one really becomes pushed to be as creative as possible. 
One has to “dig down” and become innovative.” Ivar points out that they had a good and strong 
environment surrounding them as part of the Scatec incubator. He also believed OceanWind to 
have a certain financial strength collaborating with the Grieg Group, “but the financial crisis also 
affected our owners.” As Scatec’s other firms experienced some major losses, e.g. in the solar 
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industry, this also affected OceanWind.  
 
Ivar tells me they started with two owners and that they were supposed to find additional 
investors. “We started developing the projects. And at the same time, we were working the 
capital marked, and trying to get more investors in 2009. It was hard, it was straight after the 
financial crisis, in addition, we were a relatively new start-up and did not have much substance 
in the company yet. We came close, but did not manage to find investors within a certain 
deadline.” He believes their business model to be particularly hard to cope with during times of 
recession. Ivar said they found it hard to find investors, and due to the crisis the whole industry 
became delayed. “The delay is hard to handle when one for years only have expenses and then 
waits for a big payout with delivery.”  
 
Ivar believes a recession can be a great time for starting a company; “If one at strikes the 
bottom, and if you are lucky and good, you will hit the bottom and experience the upturn, but 
timing is hard.”  
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, 
suppliers or others  
Ivar believes clusters to be good for finding partners. Accordingly, OceanWind saw the 
opportunity to develop projects in the UK and Germany, and the clusters helped the company 
find partners to get an alliance going with other large European companies, which made it 
possible to enter the competition for a major project in the UK.”We had a strong alliance.” 
“Through networks we aligned us with a Swiss venture capital company, a Belgian entrepreneur 
company; a maritime company with 200 vessels, a large company, and the world’s second 
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largest owner of wind power, a Spanish company.” OceanWind and the alliance were not able 
to win the contract; they became second. One of the competing concepts was by Statoil and 
Statkraft. Ivar said that their alliance were strong, but he believed in the end that they would not 
have been able to lift the project, as some of the partners also began to struggle due to the 
recession and had to change their business models. 
 
The company has also collaborated with other specialized companies namely; NorWind, OWEC 
Tower, BiFab Ltd, Grieg Logistics, and Troll Wind Power.30 Ivar also point out that they got 
many benefits from being in the Scatec incubator. According to Scatec and Ivar they 
“contributed with knowledge, international network and technical expertise to maximize the 
likelihood of developing a successful business."31 
 
3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes  
OceanWind was able to completely change the company and change its business model; from 
being project developers to becoming a consultant agency. (The new business offering is 
described in the section below.) “So instead of develop projects, and using much money and 
gaining a return in 5 years, we decided to continuously sell our hours; our services to other 
project developers or others in the offshore industry, and use our expertise to get money in by 
selling hours.” “This was really the only opportunity we saw.” A short time after the company 
changed, Ivar got a job offer from a head-hunter, some of the others also decided to quit, and 
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 http://www.newstatesman.com/company-profiles/technology/services/oceanwind-as retrieved 
14.06.2013. 
 
31
 http://www.scatec.no/no/Topmenu/Om-Scatec/Forretningsstruktur.aspx retrieved 12.06.2013.   
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then the company dissolved and became inactive. “The interest for continuing as consults was 
low.” Accordingly, the owners gave it a try, but were not pushing too hard to keep the firm going. 
“They had bigger issues in their other companies.” He stated that they were starting to get 
customers, but he was not sure if it would have lasted.  
 
Ivar believes creativity, thinking solution oriented and changing the business model to be key 
elements for surviving a recession. If the company had lasted, Ivar think they would have 
continued as a consultant agency, building references, but he does not exclude changing the 
business model again, and going back to the main idea as product developers.   
 
4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s)  
The company altered its business model to include much more service, acting almost entirely as 
a consultant agency: “The company offers offshore site appraisal and selection, wind resource 
assessments, site investigations, environmental impact assessments, stakeholder 
management, consenting, design engineering, offshore logistics and installation method 
statements, health, safety and environment. The company is also planning to build an offshore 
wind farm in the southern part of the Norwegian sector of the North Sea with the installed 
capacity of 1,000 MW. An offshore wind farm consisting of 200 turbines, which produce more 
than 4.5 TWh annually”.32   
 
                                               
 
32
 http://www.newstatesman.com/company-profiles/technology/services/oceanwind-as retrieved 
15.05.2013. 
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5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the 
recession  
Ivar considered taking advantage of others places as an opportunity; “It might have been an 
opportunity if we had gone on for a while longer, because there were others with similar 
business model in other countries.” Accordingly, OceanWind strategy were to enter other 
countries; “The market is too small in Norway.” In the long run Ivar believed there to have been 
good opportunities in the UK; “In the longer run, it could have been an opportunity to buy into 
projects where others were selling themselves out at an early stage and often at low cost 
because they were in financial trouble.” OceanWind were not able to take advantage of this 
however; “When it came to our own business model, we had to change it rather quickly, 
because we did not have the financial strength to act in the way that we started. So we did not 
take advantage of it.” Ivar believes the remaining companies after the crisis will “launch like 
rackets”. “It is said that if one are able to find a way to survive the recession, and you have the 
financial strength, after the dust have settled, and the market takes a turn for the better, you 
have the opportunity to pick up the remaining pieces.”  
 
When asked if they were able to take advantage of any weaken competitors, Ivar said that they 
never got so far. They tried fining investors in the Norwegian environment; power companies 
and other investors. He believed taking advantage of others not were a relevant issue at their 
stage. “We did not even consider it. We focused on developing our own projects, become well 
positioned for our own projects and get money into the company.” When asked if they were able 
to take advantage of cheaper resources, he pointed out that the time horizon was quite short 
and that they had little experience.  
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4.1.3 WindSea AS  
1. Perception 
Henning saw the recession as something positive as it had removed the unserious actors; “In 
2007-2008 it seemed to be too easy to find capital; one was not able to distinguish between the 
firms with the good, realistic ideas and opportunities, and the firms with the not so good ones.” 
He highlight the fact that in 2007-2008 everyone seemed to get financing, and that now one has 
to prove oneself much more, both in terms of technology and market potential. “All the firms 
were seen as equally good. This is not the case anymore.” “After the crisis and the major 
financial banks went bankrupt or started to struggle severely, investors became much more 
careful selecting project to invest in. That was the positive.” Henning believed the company to 
be strong both in terms of engineering and other knowledge capabilities, in addition to having 
good insights into the market. He therefore believes WindSea to hold a rather unique position; 
“Not many start-ups can say the same”. He also pointed out that the will to invest in “green 
energy” is much higher during the good period, and that many of the other firms with fluffy ideas 
are long gone now.  
 
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, 
suppliers or others  
According to Henning, one needs approximately NOK 300-400 million to develop a full-scale 
prototype. This money is hard to find; “In Norway there are very few groups to approach. You 
need a lot of money, it is not enough with say 50, 60 or 70 million or even a hundred, you need 
up to 300-400 million. And there are very few with that kind of strength in Norway. That was our 
problem.” “It has been extremely hard to find any financial or industrial partners, particularly 
financial.”  WindSea was able gain support from Innovation Norway on the condition that they 
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were able to come up with financing for the remaining cost, but the firm was not able to do so. 
WindSea was owned by three companies, today only two remain. Accordingly, the market is at 
a standstill; “FORCE and NLI is not willing to invest much more without seeing some more 
movement in the market” and Statkraft left the company in favour of for a collaboration with 
Statoil on Round 3 in the UK.  
 
Henning do not believe a collaboration to necessary improve the situation in recession. He talks 
from experience from NLI and a company called Straum and state: “If you have two immature 
technologies and companies, and combine them, it is not like 2+2=5, 2+2 becomes 3 when one 
combines two immature technologies. It does not work.” “If you take 3 immature companies, and 
combine them, the weaknesses only become easier to see.” “If it is strong partners, it might 
become easier. I am sure that if Statkraft had remained, that it would have been easier to get 
additional players to the team.”  
 
3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes  
When asked about their products, Henning told me they had two; “The first is the floater 
construction with the three windmills, but we recognized that there still would be a long time for 
the marked to mature. And we saw that there were going to be considerable development, or 
we assumed, in more shallow water down to 45 meters, so we developed another technology; a 
jacket for bottom-mounting. So we have both one for bottom-mounted, because the way to 
market was shorter, and one floater where the way to market was somewhat longer.”  
 
As WindSea is hiring from the owner’s capacity when needed, and do not have any employees 
of their own, the firm is never stuck with excess capacity. “The firm’s intention was to get its own 
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employees, but as there was so much uncertainty in the market, we decided not to employ 
ourselves. If you employ, you are stuck with fixed cost instead of variable, so we choose to hire 
in as needed. Besides, for constructing a platform you need so many different types of skills, so 
even if we employed 10-12 it would not be enough, we still would have to rent in others.” Since 
they hired in from the owners, WindSea is accordingly also able to turn the company completely 
around in a swift and adjust activity. “We could just send the resources back to the owners the 
day we would not have the need for, wanted or could do anything more in WindSea’s auspices.”  
 
While he deemed the firm as very flexible, the products were not. The company tried to collect 
funding for a prototype in full-scale, but as the money was impossible to find, the company tried 
down-scaling it to 1:8, but still struggled to find the needed financing.  Henning believed it was a 
mistake trying to first develop it in full scale; “You only get one time to make a first impression. 
The opportunity was in a way used up when we came back around a second time.” Accordingly, 
the reason for first going for the full-scale was that it would have value in itself after the test 
period, while the down-scaled would mostly have value as scrap.  
 
Henning highlights that firms should be able to downscale the firm’s cost fast in times of 
recession, and have a network, partners, where one can get resources fast if an opportunity 
emerge. “That is important, so one is able to grab it, or get rid of the costs if the opportunity 
does not materialize. Or quickly can get onboard if a wave of growth were to come.”   
 
4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s)  
According to Henning, introduction of services was never really considered; “the owners are 
offering services, so WindSea’s focus has all along been to develop and deliver products”. He 
believes that if WindSea had its own employees, the firm could have rented out these resources 
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to get by. Instead as one can see above, the company used its flexibility to introduce a product 
that was likely to be in a more mature market; the jacket. 
 
Henning believes the market would become more sceptical if one offers too many different kinds 
of products. “If you go round stating that you are the best when it comes to floating wind, best 
within bottom-mounted construction, saying we are the best within tidal power, ocean wind 
power, we are best in wave power, no one will believe you.” He believes that one should stay 
true to ones capabilities and focus on what one knows best. He is not sure they made the right 
choice going into the bottom-mounted field; “One should be extremely focused, keep the goal in 
mind, and be true to the technology if one wishes to become the best.”  
 
5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the 
recession  
Henning believed WindSea to have few competitors. One of them is the Hywind project by 
Statoil, and according to Henning, it does not seem to be affected much by the recession. 
Henning also points out that the oil and gas industry still hire as many as possible. Accordingly, 
the resources WindSea would need to develop the offshore floating technology, competes with 
demand for resources in the oil and gas offshore industry, and this has kept the prices stable. 
 
WindSea has recognized some opportunities in Denmark. “Denmark is quite affected. We have 
recognized that resources over there have become somewhat cheaper, but not in Norway”. 
WindSea used Denmark as location for testing; in wind tunnels and pool. WindSea also used a 
Danish agency for calculation on their products.  
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WindSea were in contact with China and the US. “We received considerable response, but it 
quenched. We were not able to point to any interest from the Norwegian government with any 
form of funding, and the Norwegian industry were not very interested, so then it was hard sell to 
someone in China; they would ask “why are not anyone in Norway interested?” and thus 
become very skeptical.” When asked about Japan, Henning said that it was too early. He also 
pointed out that Japan is a closed and conservative country, with great technology capabilities 
on its own, while China still have a way to go. According to Henning, in the US, the lack of 
financial support from the Norwegian government was the main reason why they were not able 
to become part of the development programs there. 
 
4.1.4 Blaaster Wind Technologies AS 
1. Perception 
Camilla believes that since it has been so hard to find capital, the firm had to become much 
more creative to survive. “I believe we have turned many rocks to find good opportunities, as 
things are tough in the industry.” Blaaster was looking for financing during 2008 and 2009, but 
were not able to find any. Camilla believed the situation to again become more unstable from 
2010. She states that “the interest for investing in renewable energy in Norway has become 
very low. The focus is completely on oil and gas; we are certainly not highly prioritized by the 
venture funds. This has made us more or less involuntary complete owners of Blaaster.”  
 
Camilla believes lack of capital to be one of the main problems of the new small entrepreneurial 
firms in recession. “It also makes investors more skeptical, i.e. our customers, this leads them to 
do a much more thorough risk analysis, and it is clear, investing in such a small company like 
ours is perceived as risky”. She point out two elements that can reduce this risk; “building more 
turbines so we have that to show to, and more capital in the company, so one becomes more 
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economically solid.” She points out that the company has been very busy regarding the 
development of the prototype, and that they will start looking towards the financial marked again 
soon. 
 
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, 
suppliers or others  
Accordingly, till now Blaaster have been standing quite alone. The company were looking for 
investors in 2008, but were not able to find any. “We were unfortunate with our timing, the 
financial crisis hit. They [Torolf and Ove] approached about 20 venture funds in Norway, but did 
not obtained any positive response. The marked was dead. They were about to give up, but in 
the spring 2010 an opportunity arose, they received a test site in Valsneset in Bjong. So then 
they at least had a test site, but still no investors.” The firm was not able to find any investors or 
partners, but was able to get 50% financing from Enova. The last 50% were hard to come up 
with. “We got some help from Innovation Norway, for the rest we had to take up a loan in a 
bank”. Camilla point out that the entrepreneurs behind the firm have long experience, a strong 
name and reputation in the industry which probably had great impact for the firm getting the 
loan. “Not to mention the support system. This helped in gaining support from Enova and 
Innovation Norway.” Camilla also highlights the firm’s strong network; “The people around us 
believed in us”. She also point out the importance of local patriotism. 
 
Camilla said they have discussed getting partners several times, but not found the timing to be 
right and that they would start looking for new partners again now; “I think we quickly will look 
outside the country. We know there to be opportunities in Germany, we know there will be major 
development in the wind industry there.” “Whether it is new owners, partners, or collaboration 
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with the competition; that is something we have to evaluate further.” She believes that the firm 
must make alliances to become a global firm, and point out that, important suppliers may be 
chosen as partners. “If we get a strong industrial actor behind us, with a good name and 
reputation, and who have the capital strength, I believe that would make customers trust us 
more and invest. I also believe we would receive the same affect if were to gain a strong 
owner.”  
 
She sees an opportunity to keep the company alive during the recession. Accordingly, if they 
are not able to find partners or customers, they can start up as an independent power supplier; 
“It is something that we have been very aware of, had one gained licenses and access to loan 
from banks for instance, we could have created activity in the company, production and so on, 
owned a little park, and in that way received income along the way.” The product is with the 
prototype, accordingly, competing with the established ones. Camilla state that their problem is 
that licenses are hard to get, partly due to the low capacity on the grid in Norway. She states 
that if it had not been for the trouble getting these licenses, they probably would have built a 
small park already.  
 
3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes  
Camilla believes the company to have a great flexibility and strength in its small size; “our ability 
to change is relatively large; we are still not so many, and we are able to use the workforce to 
many different types of tasks”. Camilla believed the firm’s small size, not having too much 
infrastructure yet, have made them able to keep the wheels turning, while larger firms struggle 
more. She adds; “Seeing other struggle may have helped us find opportunities.” 
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Blaaster’s wind turbine is said to be very adjustable, “the prototype is a large wind turbine 
developed for Norwegian conditions, wind class 1. With small and easy alterations, it can be 
adjusted to function well in Sweden, the continent, Germany and so on.” “Our turbine is also 
very well suited for use offshore; it can be used almost direct. Only the bottom solution has to be 
altered.” 
 
 
4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s)  
Accordingly, all the employees have engineering backgrounds. When asked if they had 
considered renting out their expertise, Camilla said they still had so much to do, that it had not 
come to that, but it could be a possibility. Blaaster however, sees an opportunity in putting its 
service and maintenance cost lower that the competitors. Blaaster have just finished their 
prototype. Accordingly, “the turbine is built to be very service friendly; not require a lot of service 
and maintenance. We offer service, but it is not our main focus.” “We went for a turbine that 
would not require much attention afterwards, since we know many of the power companies 
today are dissatisfied with the suppliers on the market now, i.e. the big established firms, 
because they offer very expensive service and maintenance contract.”  
 
Camilla believed the industry was charging so much on their service and maintenance contracts 
to cope with the downturn; “since the contractors also are affected, the turbine providers set the 
initial price low to get the contract. But when the park is build and the power is flowing, revenues 
from power sales starts, and then they are able to pay for the service and maintenance. So then 
the turbine providers turn up the price to be able to get back some of the lost earnings from 
setting the initial price so low.” 
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Camilla believes that their small size and expertise can make it possible to get through by 
offering services, but that the company then has to look abroad. Camilla believes it is towards 
Asia one must look to find opportunities, and adds “we believe the European market to remain 
difficult”.  
 
Camilla state that they are trying to think differently from the rest, they want to prioritize building 
as qualified stab as possible, specialize, become a “centre of excellence” to increase the firms 
chance of remaining Norwegian. “We do not want the company do disappear; move abroad, like 
many others.” The entrepreneurs experienced that with the sale of their previous company, 
when it was sold to America.  
 
 
5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the 
recession  
“One man's death, the other's bread. [A Norwegian saying] There is something to it. There will 
always emerge new opportunities as someone struggle.” Camilla point out some of benefits with 
the recession; “You may get rid of some of the competition, it may also become easier to stand 
out as the other go under.”   
 
When asked if they had experienced cheaper or more available resources, Camilla said that 
when they had been hiring in 2011, they had an overwhelming amount of applications; “The 
majority were from abroad. Many from Spain, a lot from Portugal, some form France. So yes, for 
us it has been real noticeable.” And they were accordingly highly educated; “…with masters 
degrees and over.” She points out that this was before the big oil boom; “we could pick from the 
top of the litter”. Accordingly, in 2012 it became a bit harder again.  
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Camilla believed the prices on material to have remained stable; “Blaaster uses a lot of steal, 
but as there is a high demand in Asia, the prices has been quite stable”. She also point out that 
the Euro has been low, and that it has been a benefit for the company, as they do a lot of buying 
from the Euro zone.  
 
Blaaster sees opportunities in its neighboring country, Sweden. She believes Sweden to be 
further along than Norway, “they already have a grid, and have started major development”. 
 
Camilla points out that prior experience and knowledge have made them able to create a 
product with a quarter of the money, and a 1/10 of the resources as seen with similar 
companies in other countries. She believe their experience and knowledge  to be essential for 
the firm success; “They knew exactly what to do, what not to do, good experience and have 
eliminated wrong tracks early on and they have known what to do instead.” Camilla also 
highlights local patriotism; “We would not have been able to achieve the same abroad”. 
 
She do not believe that Blaaster have been able to take advantage of the opportunities they 
have seen; “Not yet. Mainly because we have not been able to get the licenses, in addition to 
problems finding financing.” 
    
4.3 Case-by-case analysis 
4.3.1 WindFlip AS 
1. Perception 
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A crisis can be perceived as a threat or as an opportunity according to Penrose (2000). 
Accordingly, firms that see it as an opportunity invest, and the firms that see it as a threat, 
conserve resources. WindFlip did not conserve recourses; they produced and tested a 
prototype. WindFlip perceived some opportunities in recession. The firm perceived opportunities 
related to more public funding and a higher focus on start-ups due to the recession. However, 
as the firm had limited resources, and the market was very immature, the firm perceived less 
opportunities as the market was delayed and customer demand dropped.   
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, 
suppliers or others  
WindFlip believed partners to be essential for the company, not only in times of recession but 
always. The firm however, was not able to create any partnerships. Ane said the problem was 
that it was too far into the future, that “nobody needed to take a stand to it now”. As described 
by Pearce II and Michael (2006), this is typical for recessions; decisions that can be deferred or 
delayed usually are.  
 
3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes  
WindFlip altered their business model to focus on consultant services. Ane said they could have 
continued, but that this was not something they wanted to do. The firm recognized and took 
action; they exploited the opportunity, but did not want to continue due to personal preferences.  
 
4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s)  
The company did not see any additional opportunities, besides offering services.  
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5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the 
recession  
The firm did not see any opportunity to take advantage of others countries, firms or cheaper 
resources. As the company was in a new and immature industry, this is not very strange. 
According to Srinivasan et al. (2005) the greater the perceived severity of the recession, the 
fewer the choices managers have in responding to the recession, and therefore, are less likely 
to treat the recession as an opportunity.  
 
4.3.2 OceanWind AS 
1. Perception 
OceanWind did not perceive many opportunities in recession with their first business model as 
project developers. Ivar pointed out limited experience and the firm’s newness. He does 
however recognize an opportunity connected to starting a firm in recession; experiencing the 
following upturn.  
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, 
suppliers or others  
OceanWind recognized opportunities regarding alliances and partnership, and were able to 
make a strong alliance. Still, the firm did not endure. This illustrates that it is not necessary 
enough to gain strong partners to survive a recession. Even strong actors can start to struggle 
during a severe downturn.  
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3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes  
OceanWind recognized opportunities regarding its flexibility, and adapted to the decreased 
demand, by changing the firm’s business model. The firm recognized the benefit of not being a 
firm with very volatile earnings; only expenses, then getting the income all at once. Firms with 
volatile earnings are said to be particular affected by recession.33 Altering the business model to 
get income continually, by selling labor hours, can be seen as a good choice to help the firm 
survive, according to theory. However, firms whose value largely derives from intangible assets 
are also at higher risk of financial distress, since they have little that can be sold off to repay 
debt.34 
 
4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s)  
Ivar said that changing the firm’s business model and becoming a consulting agency; offering 
services, was the only opportunity they saw.  
 
5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the 
recession  
                                               
 
33
 http://www.investopedia.com/walkthrough/corporate-finance/5/capital-structure/pie-structure-
financing.aspx#ixzz2CswhCaaW retrieved 02.07.2013.  
34
 http://www.investopedia.com/walkthrough/corporate-finance/5/capital-structure/pie-structure-
financing.aspx#ixzz2CswhCaaW retrieved 02.07.2013. 
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OceanWind recognized opportunities regarding acquiring other projects sold at low prices, but 
this was not an opportunity the firm could have exploited, as it had very limited financial 
resources. Ivar perceived it to be an opportunity for the long run. 
 
4.3.3 WindSea AS 
1. Perception 
According to Tang et al. (2012) new opportunities may emerge as a result of prior experience, 
personal dispositions, from gaining specific information, being a frustrated user or changes in 
the broader environment. Henning believed the company to be strong both in terms of 
engineering and other knowledge capabilities, in addition to having good insights into the 
market. He recognized that WindSea holds a rather unique position. In this case, the firm has 
the experience, and is experiencing the change in broader demand. Their experience is likely to 
have great impact of the firm, recognizing opportunities regarding something that is usually seen 
as something negative; it becoming harder to get financing. Their knowledge and experience 
can be a great source of opportunities. The nature of the knowledge is likely to influence the 
volume and type of opportunities available for discovery and exploitation (Eckhardt and Shane, 
2003).  
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, 
suppliers or others  
WindSea recognized opportunities related to strong financial or industrial partners. Henning has 
also knowledge and experience within this field. He points out that collaborating with others not 
necessary improve the situation. Recognizing that a relationship does not exist is also an 
opportunity according to Drucker (1985). Henning talks from experience from NLI and a 
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company called Straum and state: “If you have two immature technologies and companies, and 
combine them, it is not like 2+2=5, 2+2 becomes 3 when one combines two immature 
technologies. It does not work.”   
 
3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes  
WindSea recognized that it did not need to have so high fixed costs; only hiring in when needed. 
Exploiting this opportunity has made the firm very flexible, and likely to cope better with the 
uncertain environment.  
 
4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s)  
WindSea recognized the opportunity to introduce a less immature product, a jacket for bottom-
mounted turbines. It did not perceive introduction of service as an opportunity the firm wanted to 
exploit. Henning also recognized not having too many products. He believes the market would 
become more sceptical if one offers too many different kinds of products. 
 
5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the 
recession  
The firm recognized using services in other countries hit harder by recession; doing testing in 
Denmark. Japan is one of the world’s leaders within technology, choosing to go to China instead 
can be seen as an opportunity. However, they were not able to exploit this opportunity, or in the 
US, due to lacking financial support from the Norwegian government.  
 
69 
 
4.3.4 Blaaster Wind Technologies AS 
1. Perception 
Blaaster does not see many opportunity due to the recession, but they have been able to find 
some by using their experience, knowledge and being creative.  
 
2. Merger, create a partnership or cooperating with competitors, customers, 
suppliers or others  
Blaaster recognize an opportunity in being completely independent; turning its company into a 
power company if they are not able to find customers or partners. However, this is not 
something they have been able to exploit.  
 
Blaaster has been able to get loan from a bank, this has created opportunities, making them 
able to develop the prototype in full-scale. Camilla believes the firm gained this opportunity due 
to their strong network, reputation and experience, as the entrepreneurs have developed and 
sold a company previously. She also believes the company has gained this opportunity, due to 
local patriotism.  
 
Camilla recognized strong suppliers to be a source of opportunities. She perceived these to be 
located abroad, and that alliances are necessary to become a global firm.  
 
3. Using its smaller size and flexibility to adapt and realign to the changes  
Camilla recognized the firm’s small size as an opportunity; being more flexible. Blaaster saw the 
turbine as flexible, making it possible to use in many different locations.  
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4. Offer non- or counter-cycle products and (more) service(s)  
Blaaster recognized an opportunity in putting its service and maintenance cost lower that the 
competitors. They had not considered focus on service an opportunity they wanted to exploit. 
Camilla recognized their service to be an opportunity with a greater market potential abroad.  
 
5. Taking advantage of others (firms, areas, etc) that are affected harder by the 
recession  
Blaaster recognize the opportunity to stand out as the competition gets weaker and disappear. 
They also recognized opportunities to emerge as someone struggle. They have recognized and 
exploited trading with a good Euro/NOK ratio. They recognized and exploited the opportunity to 
pick top candidates, when hiring in times of recession.  
 
4.4 Cross case analysis and discussion 
This thesis have used firms in three technical groups; bottom-mounted in shallow water, in deep 
water and floating. WindSea and WindFlip are both in floating, but WindSea seemed to 
recognize more than WindFlip. This seems to be due to WindSea having much more knowledge 
and experience from years in the industry, and WindFlip being new entrepreneurs starting few 
years before from an incubator at a university.  
 
This thesis considered firms with different level of success, and by success this thesis 
measured that by their level of activity now, well into the recession. OceanWind was in the 
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bottom-mounted in deep water, an immature industry and is inactive. WindFlip is inactive, and 
WindSea active but with limited activity, both focusing on the floating segment, and with an 
immature market and technology. Blaaster was the only firm in a maturity industry, and was the 
company that seemed to do the best, having the most activity. Blaaster is in the most mature 
market, but the firm also have much experience, having entrepreneurs which have developed 
and sold a company before.  
 
The firms were asked the same main questions; their responses were quite different. How they 
perceive opportunities seem to be dependent on the different levels of experience. Experience, 
knowledge and network are likely to have a great impact. Not surprisingly, also seem on the 
firm’s ability to recognize opportunities and what kind of opportunities they decided to exploit. 
5 Conclusion  
In short, recessions cause lowered sales, decreased margins, and reduced credit, yielding 
significant shocks to the resources available to the firm, thus threatening its survival (Pearce II 
and Michael, 2006). This thesis found that entrepreneurial firms perceived many opportunities in 
times of recession, but not due to the recession, as a necessity. The firms were able to see both 
positive and negative sides. Pre-existing knowledge and experience seem to highly influence 
how they perceive and acted in regard to the recession, and to which degree they saw it as an 
opportunity or a threat.  
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Entrepreneurial firms recognized opportunities regarding partnerships, more public funding 
schemes, more attention and the opportunity to stand out. Opportunities were also recognized 
for how the firm standing alone; focusing on its product development, and delivering the best. 
Opportunities were recognized regarding their small size, making them flexible and able to 
adjust their business model and product offering; introducing (more) service, more mature 
products or low cost products/services. The opportunities to pick up the pieces, and acquire 
companies at low prices, during a recession were recognized, but not something the 
entrepreneurial firms were able to do. The firms recognized opportunities regarding limiting fixed 
costs, taking advantage of local patriotism and being able to hire top resources.  
 
When it comes to how they act upon opportunities, this thesis found that all the entrepreneurial 
firms acted on opportunities regarding establishment of partnerships and collaboration. 
However, actually getting and holding this partnership were tough in times of recession. 
Entrepreneurial firms also highlight adaption and the firm’s flexibility as important for the firm’s 
survival. As the firm struggled to get customers and investors, the firms altered their product 
offerings or their business model. Changing their business model however, does not imply 
success, and the interest for continuing with a new business model seemed to lack with many of 
the firm’s employees.  
6 Implications and further research 
6.1 Implications for entrepreneurial firms  
To be able to follow up on the opportunities one may find, financing is needed. Partners and 
investors are hard to find and hard to hold in times of recession. As recessions lead to deferred 
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and delayed investments, be aware that things in general take much longer time. One should 
expect and prepare for investor doing more due diligence and demanding more, as risk and 
uncertainty are higher in these downturns. If the firm is having trouble selling products, selling 
solutions or services can help keep the company afloat till the market turns around. Avoiding too 
many fixed cost can make the firm more flexible, and able to adjust to the changes more easily.  
 
The firm should keep in mind where it has its greatest comparative advantage. Introducing more 
or other products and services can lead to lost focus on one’s main product and dispersion of 
limited resources into nothing. Going too strong into other countries, where the recession is not 
so severe, may lead to less support from the home country’s support systems.  
 
In order to detect opportunities and threats Pearce II and Michael (1997, 2006) suggest that the 
entrepreneurial firm must engage in constant scanning for information about the 
macroeconomic environment, as well as industry and competitive conditions in a cost-effective 
manner. Making a list over possible opportunities to exploit can help the firm become more 
aware of its actual opportunities. It can also be useful in prioritizing which ones to pursue, when 
one cannot afford to do them all. 
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6.2 Implications for policy makers 
Things are happening in the offshore wind industry around the world. From Massachusetts in 
the US, to Portugal and Japan. Statoil have had great results from the Hywind project, but the 
industry in Norway is at a standstill. The promising words of Åslaug Haga35, Terje Riis-Johansen 
and Trond Giske regarding the offshore wind industry becoming Norway’s next industry and 
energy adventure (Hansen and Steen, 2011), have resolved into nothing. As one of the leading 
countries within the offshore industry; with much experience and skilled resources, Norway has 
great potential. Norway also has great financial strength. Words need to be turned into action. 
As put by Henning Arnøy; “academic research is good, but it does not create an industry. It 
takes real investments to create jobs and an industry”. Norway has to take advantage of the 
great opportunities it possesses. One should not be blinded by many opportunities within the oil 
and gas industry; there are many other important opportunities too. The country has hydro 
power, but one should recognize that others are not so lucky. Many countries have real needs 
for power and do not have clean power sources. Norway can develop and own the technology, 
but sell it elsewhere. There is a major market globally, and the market positions are not taken 
yet. With some help, the entrepreneurial firms can create many new jobs, take risk, and also 
help turn around times of recession. Norway’s offshore lead is not going to last, other countries 
will soon surpass, and the opportunity will be lost if action is not taken soon. 
 
                                               
 
35
 http://www.tu.no/energi/2007/10/31/svimlende-potensial-for-offshore-vindkraft retrieved 18.06.2013. 
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6.3 Future research 
There is still much to do within the field of opportunity research, especially on the empirical side. 
This thesis has been explorative; identifying what kind of opportunities and actions 
entrepreneurial firms see and acts upon during times of recession. The opportunities should be 
further investigated; finding cause and effect in explanatory case studies, and deeming their 
impact and value with quantitative approaches. Different dependencies should be identified and 
analyzed. Surveys, with a large group of different entrepreneurial firms, can give more 
generalizing results. The opportunities should also be investigated with a longitude perspective, 
to see how they evolve over time.  
 
Strong partners can be essential for surviving a recession. How entrepreneurial firms can find 
and retain these partners or investors during times of recession is an interesting question, which 
answer could help many firms to survive.  
 
  
76 
 
References 
ALVAREZ, S. A. & BUSENITZ, L. W. 2001. The entrepreneurship of resource-based theory. 
Journal of Management, 27, 755-775. 
ARDICHVILI, A., CARDOZO, R. & RAY, S. 2003. A theory of entrepreneurial opportunity 
identification and development. Journal of Business Venturing, 18, 105-123. 
ASSOCIATION, E. W. E. 2012. The European offshore wind industry key 2011 trends and 
statistics. 
BROMILEY, P., NAVARRO, P. & SOTTILE, P. 2008. Strategic business cycle management and 
organizational performance: a great unexplored research stream. Strategic Organization, 
6, 207-219. 
BURT, R. S. 2000. The network entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship: The social science view, 281-
307. 
CASE, K. E. & FAIR, R. C. 2007. Principles of microeconomics, Pearson Education. 
CHOI, Y. R. & SHEPHERD, D. A. 2004. Entrepreneurs’ Decisions to Exploit Opportunities. 
Journal of Management, 30, 377-395. 
CLAESSENS, S., KOSE, M. A. & TERRONES, M. E. 2009. What happens during recessions, 
crunches and busts? Economic Policy, 24, 653-700. 
COHEN, B. & WINN, M. I. 2007. Market imperfections, opportunity and sustainable 
entrepreneurship. Journal of Business Venturing, 22, 29-49. 
DAHLQVIST, J. & WIKLUND, J. 2012. Measuring the market newness of new ventures. Journal 
of Business Venturing, 27, 185-196. 
DRUCKER, P. F. 1985. The discipline of innovation. Harvard business review, 63, 67. 
ECKHARDT, J. T. & SHANE, S. A. 2003. Opportunities and entrepreneurship. Journal of 
management, 29, 333-349. 
77 
 
EISENHARDT, K. M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
management review, 532-550. 
FANELLI, C. & EVANS, B. 2013. From Great Recession to Great Deception: Reimagining the 
Roots of the Crisis. Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research, 24. 
HANSEN, G. H. & STEEN, M. 2011. VINDKRAFT TIL HAVS - Teknologi- og industriutvikling fra 
et norsk bedriftsperspektiv. 1/2011 ed. CenSES CenSES & NTNU. 
IRELAND, R. D., HITT, M. A. & SIRMON, D. G. 2003. A model of strategic entrepreneurship: 
The construct and its dimensions. Journal of management, 29, 963-989. 
LANDSTRÖM, H. 1999. The roots of entrepreneurship research. New England Journal of 
Entrepreneurship, 2, 9-20. 
LILIEN, G. L. & SRINIVASAN, R. 2010. Marketing spending strategy in recessions. Australasian 
Marketing Journal (AMJ), 18, 181-182. 
PAPAOIKONOMOU, E., SEGARRA, P. & LI, X. 2012. Entrepreneurship in the Context of Crisis: 
Identifying Barriers and Proposing Strategies. International Advances in Economic 
Research, 18, 111-119. 
PARKER, S. C. 2012. Theories of entrepreneurship, innovation and the business cycle. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, 26, 377-394. 
PEARCE II, J. A. & MICHAEL, S. C. 1997. Marketing strategies that make entrepreneurial firms 
recession-resistant. Journal of business venturing, 12, 301-314. 
PEARCE II, J. A. & MICHAEL, S. C. 2006. Strategies to prevent economic recessions from 
causing business failure. Business Horizons, 49, 201-209. 
PENROSE, J. M. 2000. The role of perception in crisis planning. Public Relations Review, 26, 
155-171. 
SARASVATHY, S. D., DEW, N., VELAMURI, S. R. & VENKATARAMAN, S. 2010. Three views 
of entrepreneurial opportunity. Handbook of entrepreneurship research. Springer. 
78 
 
SEIDLER, J. 1974. On using informants: A technique for collecting quantitative data and 
controlling measurement error in organization analysis. American Sociological Review, 
816-831. 
SHANE, S. 2000. Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Organization science, 11, 448-469. 
SHANE, S. & VENKATARAMAN, S. 2000. The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of 
research. Academy of Management Review, 25, 217-226. 
SRINIVASAN, R., RANGASWAMY, A. & LILIEN, G. L. 2005. Turning adversity into advantage: 
Does proactive marketing during a recession pay off? International Journal of Research 
in Marketing, 22, 109-125. 
SØRHEIM, R. 2003. The pre-investment behaviour of business angels: a social capital 
approach. Venture Capital, 5, 337-364. 
TANG, J., KACMAR, K. M. & BUSENITZ, L. 2012. Entrepreneurial alertness in the pursuit of 
new opportunities. Journal of Business Venturing, 27, 77-94. 
VAGHELY, I. P. & JULIEN, P.-A. 2010. Are opportunities recognized or constructed?: An 
information perspective on entrepreneurial opportunity identification. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 25, 73-86. 
VOLDEN, G. H., BULL-BERG, H., SKJERET, F., FINNE, H. & HOFMANN, M. 2009a. Vindkraft 
offshore og industrielle muligheter, SINTEF Publikasjoner, SINTEF. 
VOLDEN, G. H. B.-B., HEIDI, SKJERET, F. F., HÅKON & HOFMANN, M. 2009b. Vindkraft 
offshore og industrielle muligheter, SINTEF Publikasjoner, SINTEF. 
YIN, R. K. 2008. Case study research: Design and methods, SAGE Publications, Incorporated. 
 
 
 
